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Abstract
The aim of this document is to present SiSTEM, a mulƟ-level simulaƟon model of European short-term
electricity markets, covering day-ahead and intraday exchanges to balancing acƟvaƟons in real-Ɵme,
and imbalance seƩlement. In this model, power companies interact by making oﬀers, noƟfying their
posiƟons to the system operator and impacƟng the balance of the electric system. The system operator
acƟvates balancing energy to restore the balance of the system, using all balancing acƟvaƟon oﬀers,
including from balancing reserves. Imbalance seƩlement implies bidirecƟonal transacƟons between the
system operator and power companies depending on the direcƟon of their imbalance. A simulaƟon of
the model is performed by sequenƟally considering each Ɵme step and simulaƟng actors’ decisions.
The objecƟve of this model is to understand the problems behind decisions of the actors within the short-
term electrical system operaƟon, to provide insights on how these problems can be solved through mar-
ket design and to see how the decisions are linked together to shape a coherent system. This paper
presents diﬀerent simulaƟon cases of an illustraƟve system in order to portray main features of the
model in a pracƟcal and eﬀecƟve manner. In parƟcular, the results show the importance of considering
steady-state constraints and noƟce delays of generaƟon units when looking at short-term issues. Future
works could use this model to provide quanƟtaƟve assessments of short-term market designs.
Key words: Electricity markets, balancing markets, simulaƟon model, mulƟ-level opƟmizaƟon, explicit
oﬀers building, steady-state constraints.
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The European Union recently approved the Network Code on Electricity Balancing, which aims at de-
veloping cross-border balancing markets [7] this enhancing compeƟƟon and reducing costs. Further
reforms of the European internal electricity market is subject to actual debate following on from legisla-
Ɵve proposals from the European commission [21]. Assessing the impact of these regulatory changes
is essenƟal and moƟvates the development of an adequate model. This paper presents the mulƟ-level
simulaƟon model SiSTEM aiming to model the short-term electrical system and allowing such analyses.
The introducƟon starts with a descripƟon of the context in SecƟon 1.1, follows with the structure of
the model and its objecƟves in SecƟon 1.2 and ends with a review of the relevant literature in SecƟon
1.3. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The descripƟon of SiSTEM is divided in three parts:
the energy market models, the power companies model and the system operator model. These models
are the object of SecƟons 2, 3 and 4, respecƟvely with more detailed informaƟon on the models of the
producƟon assets in SecƟon 7. To portray main features of the model, results for an illustraƟve system
are given in SecƟon 5. Finally, SecƟon 6 concludes and provides future perspecƟves for the model.
1.1. Context
Electricity is one of the most complex commodiƟes to exchange due to the physical constraints under-
lying its producƟon, consumpƟon and transport. Electricity ﬂows quasi-instantaneously through the
network. Maintaining electrical system stability requires maintaining the balance between producƟon
and consumpƟon at every instant. Unlike other goods, electricity cannot be eﬃciently stored in large
volumes. Hydro-electric storage is limited by its low energy density and conversion eﬃciency from elec-
trical to mechanical to gravitaƟonal energy, and the other way around. BaƩery capaciƟes are small and
costly with respect to the needs for electrical energy. AlternaƟves exist but sƟll fail to provide an ideal
lossless and costless storage soluƟon for electricity.
To maintain the balance between producƟon and consumpƟon, electricity is traded before its actual
delivery so that actors within the electrical system know in advance how much they are expected to
produce or consume. This expectaƟononly parƟally delivers in reality since producƟon and consumpƟon
are uncertain. Electricity retailers who buy electricity on the wholesale market and sell it to end-user
consumers cannot perfectly predict the power consumpƟon of their clients’. Consumers do not inform
their retailer that they intend to iron or watch the television in a few hours. PredicƟons of electrical
producƟon from the wind or the sun are as accurate as weather . ProducƟon and transmission assets
are subject to outages. Given these uncertainƟes, actors could be tempted to exchange electricity as
late as possible to get the best outcome. However, the most ﬂexible producƟon assets are also usually
the most expensive ones. Therefore, relying solely on last-minute exchanges would be economically
ineﬃcient.
Achieving economic eﬃciency of electrical producƟon at a large scale is the purpose of electricity mar-
kets. A power company willing to saƟsfy the demands of its consumers may either use its own pro-
ducƟon assets or buy energy on the electricity markets if it is expected to be cheaper. Exchanges may
occur from the long-term, i.e. a few years ahead, to the short-term. This document focuses on Euro-
pean short-term electricity markets, in parƟcular the day-ahead, the intraday and the balancing ones. In
Europe at 12:00, the day-aheadmarket clears oﬀers to buy or sell electrical energy for the next day. This
market gives prices for each hour of the next day, which are oŌen taken as reference for other ﬁnancial
transacƟons of electrical energy. Exchanges occurring aŌer the gate closure of the day-ahead market
are carried out in the intraday market. Usually, these exchanges are triggered by changes in forecasts
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or outages of producƟon units, and give opportuniƟes to power companies to balance their porƞolio.
The intraday market is diﬀerent from one European country to another. The number of market periods,
i.e. minimum spanning period of a market oﬀer, also depends on the type of product and country e.g.
one hour, half an hour, or a quarter of an hour. For instance, the French intraday market allows conƟn-
uous trading of 30-minute products up to 30minutes ahead of real-Ɵme [18]. Germany opens an hourly
intraday market at 15:00 for the next day. At 16:00, the conƟnuous market opens and allows trading
15-minute products up to 30 minutes before delivery begins [14]. In Switzerland, energy on 15 minutes
is traded conƟnuously up to one hour ahead [15]. The intradaymarket of Spain clears hourly products in
six sessions occurring at 17:00 and 21:00 in the day-ahead and at 1:00, 4:00, 8:00 and 12:00 in intraday
[32]. Since there is no unique clearing, there is no unique price seƩled in intraday for the same product,
i.e., electricity delivered for a given Ɵme unit.
While energy markets aim at improving the economic eﬃciency of its producƟon, the system operator
ensures the security of its electrical system. One of its most important tasks is to ensure the equality
between producƟon and consumpƟon in real-Ɵme. To separate natural monopolies from deregulated
acƟviƟes, the European Commission has, through ArƟcle 9 of the DirecƟve 2009/72/EC, prevented the
system operator from directly or indirectly performing any of the funcƟons of generaƟon or supply ex-
cept in emergency situaƟons [20]. The system operator must therefore resort to other methods than
taking over producƟon units to ensure the security of its system and have enough Ɵme to take acƟons.
The neutralizaƟon delay deﬁnes theminimumƟmeneeded by the systemoperator to analyze the impact
of a change in the producƟon plan. The term schedule in this document refers to the last schedule
deﬁned at the neutralizaƟon delay. Each producer must declare to the system operator its injecƟons
and oﬀ-takes from all its producƟon assets connected to the transmission network. Throughout the
day, a producer may deﬁne various schedules for its assets. Any change of schedule noƟﬁed past this
delay is rejected. The neutralized schedule can only be modiﬁed by the system operator to acƟvate
balancing oﬀers or in case of outages. This delay indirectly limits intraday market exchanges since the
producƟon schedule cannot be changed.
Diﬀerences between producƟon and consumpƟon may sƟll occur due to outages and forecast errors.
These diﬀerences are balanced by the system operator using the balancingmechanism [10]. Imbalances
are solved by three types of balancing capaciƟes: frequency containment reserve, frequency restora-
Ɵon reserve and reserve replacement. The organizaƟon of these steps throughout Ɵme and space is
represented in Figure 1. The frequency containment reserve provides a fast and automaƟc response
proporƟonal to the variaƟon of frequency. This control is distributed among the diﬀerent countries of
a synchronized area and assets of the electrical system. The frequency restoraƟon reserve provides the
missing energy in order to release assets parƟcipaƟng in the frequency containment process such that
they are available for future imbalances. Balancing levers of frequency restoraƟon are usually split into
the manual and the automaƟc part, leading to diﬀerent acƟvaƟon delays and processes. The reserve re-
placement occurs aŌer the frequency restoraƟon to either relieve the frequency restoraƟon process, to
restore market eﬃciency, or to improve the security of the system. This model focuses on the balancing
energy oﬀered in the frequency restoraƟon and reserve replacement.
Actors with ﬂexible assets, tradiƟonally producers, communicate their ﬂexibility and their acƟvaƟon
cost to the system operator before real-Ɵme. The regulator may watch over these acƟvaƟon costs to
avoid market power issues in the balancing mechanism. To ensure that enough ﬂexibility is available
to balance the system, balancing capacity can be reserved. ReservaƟons can be done through bilateral
contracts or dedicated markets where power companies are the sellers and the only buyer is the system
operator. System operators of zones with compaƟble market designs can buy balancing capacity in a
unique market. These reservaƟons may be performed on the long term e.g. one year, but will tend














Figure 1: Balancing mechanism hierarchy throughout Ɵme and space. Inspired from [8, 11].
cost aimed at covering the loss of opportunity resulƟng from the reservaƟon. Keeping upward ﬂexibility
oﬀ the markets could prevent a power company from making proﬁts when market prices are higher
than the producƟon costs of a reserved producƟon unit. Reserving downward ﬂexibility could impose
a producer to produce at a loss if the electricity market prices are low. Note that power companies
could also exchange their balancing capacity between them throughout the reserve market. In addiƟon
to contracted reserves, addiƟonal balancing capacity can usually be obtained on the short term. The
regulaƟon of some countries imposes on power companies to provide the ﬂexibility that has not been
sold in the energy markets to the system operator. In other countries, for instance Germany, the system
operator may not rely on addiƟonal balancing capaciƟes.
The system operator acƟvates its available balancing capacity based on the current system imbalance
and forecasts of future imbalances. The system operator does its best to acƟvate balancing energy at
the lower cost. The cheapest producƟon unit is selected to provide upward balancing, while downward
balancing is preferably obtained by decreasing the producƟon of the most expensive asset. Taking the
cheapest coursemay not be possible due to technical constraints and uncertainƟes on the future system
imbalances. These acƟvaƟons have a costwhich is transferred to the power companies via the imbalance
seƩlement.
Before the neutralizaƟon delay, a power company communicates to the system operator its net posiƟon
resulƟng from its exchanges with others. The imbalance of a power company is given by the diﬀerence
between its realizaƟon and its net posiƟon over a given period. This period is called the imbalance
seƩlement period. A posiƟve imbalance, e.g. too much producƟon, leads to a payment by the system
operator to the power company proporƟonal to the posiƟve imbalance price. A negaƟve imbalance, e.g.
not enough producƟon, leads to a payment by the power company to the system operator proporƟonal
to the negaƟve imbalance price. These imbalance prices are a funcƟon of the total system imbalance and
the balancing acƟvaƟon costs. These prices should be designed to minimize total system cost, usually
by dissuading power companies from increasing the total system imbalance.
Note that the term “balancing” is quite broad reaching since it includes all eﬀorts made by the actors of
the system to balance it. The balancing not only includes the system operator but also power companies
themselves which parƟcipates to the balancing of the system. This parƟcipaƟon can be direct - via
the acƟvaƟon of balancing energy, or indirect - via deviaƟons from their net posiƟons which can be
intenƟonal or not. Note that intenƟonal deviaƟons can be either help or hinder the systemdepending on
the signal sent by the imbalance prices. A balancing mechanism should therefore be carefully designed
to provide convenient signals. Survey [13] from the ENTSO-E provides a quick overview of the diversity
in Europe of balancing mechanisms in 2015.
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1.2. Structure of the model and objecƟves
The aim of this document is to present one method to model short-term electricity markets from ex-
changes that occur the day before to balancing acƟvaƟons and imbalance seƩlement. This model fo-
cuses on a single market zone, which generally corresponds to one country, neglecƟng losses and net-
work constraints. Power companies interact with the day-ahead electricity market, the intraday market
and the system operator by building market oﬀers, providing their posiƟons to the system operator and
impacƟng the balance of the electric system. The energy market clears by maximizing the sum of the
surpluses of the oﬀers. The system operator acƟvates balancing energy to restore the balance of the
system, using all the available balancing capacity, including reserve, which changes the realizaƟon of
the power companies. The cost of these acƟvaƟons deﬁnes the imbalance prices. These prices are part
of the imbalance seƩlement mechanism creaƟng bidirecƟonal transacƟons between power companies



























Figure 2: Overview of the interacƟons within the short-term electricity market model.
Time in the model is discreƟzed into simulaƟon Ɵme steps. Imbalances are oŌen seƩled at a resoluƟon
of 15 minutes, which imposes to a simulaƟon Ɵme step to cover at most 15 minutes. To integrate this
constraint, the described model is developed to be ﬂexible for resoluƟons going from one hour to ﬁve
minutes. The resoluƟon also acts as the smallest common divisor in the model. Imbalance seƩlement
periods, intraday market periods and day-ahead market periods can all be expressed as sets of simula-
Ɵon Ɵme steps. One simulaƟon with the model is performed by sequenƟally considering each Ɵme step
of the horizon to be simulated, given the decisions taken in previous steps. An example of the situaƟon
at the simulaƟon Ɵme step 12:00 of 15 minutes is presented in Figure 3. The clearings of intraday and
day-ahead markets occur at 12:00 for energy delivered in future simulaƟon Ɵme steps. Power compa-
nies may not change their producƟon plan in the period 12:00-13:00. Further Ɵme steps are open to
modiﬁcaƟons of the schedule and power companies rely on planned schedules to build oﬀers for intra-
day and day-ahead markets. Assuming a system operator acƟng, at most, half an hour in advance, the
acƟvaƟon of balancing is performed in the period 12:00-12:30. In the model, since all informaƟon is
known aŌer the realizaƟon, the imbalance prices of the last imbalance seƩlement period are seƩled in
the following simulaƟon Ɵme step. Assuming an imbalance seƩlement period of a quarter of an hour,
the imbalance prices between 11:45 and 12:00 are seƩled at the end of the Ɵme step 12:00.
This document breaks down the explanaƟon of the model into three parts: energy markets models, the
balancing mechanism model and the model of a power company. They are respecƟvely described in
SecƟon 2, 4 and 3. The objecƟve of building this model is ﬁrst to understand the problems behind ac-
Ɵons and decisions of the actors of the short-term electrical system. The second objecƟve is to provide
insights into how these problems can be solved. Usually the methods are complex and there is dedi-
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Figure 3: Impact of the acƟons taken at the simulaƟon Ɵme step 12h of 15minutes given a neutralizaƟon
delay of one hour and a system operator acƟvaƟng balancing at most half an hour in advance.
the European day-ahead electricity market is itself the topic of numerous researches, e.g. [5, 27]. Unit
scheduling is a very important element of the strategy of a producer and has become a renowned re-
search topic for the operaƟon research community, e.g. [36, 38, 45]. The third modeling objecƟve is to
see how the decisions are linked together in order to shape a coherent system. The links can be market
oﬀers, ﬁnancial transacƟons, price signals, etc. In parƟcular, building oﬀers for the day-ahead market
may not be straighƞorward since the products exchanged in this market cannot always accurately rep-
resent the constraints of some producƟon units.
Once the model is built, the last objecƟve can be achieved: assessing the impact of changing the short-
term market design or the type of system i.e. the producƟon mix, the number of power companies,
etc. This is the topic of SecƟon 5, which starts by analyzing the results of a simulated reference case and
follows with sensiƟvity analyses of various parameters of the model and market design.
1.3. Literature review
Many electricity market models exist; see [22] for a detailed review. This secƟon reviews models which
focus on the short-term European electricity markets. Table 1 provides a quick overview of the mod-
els reviewed in this paper, as well as SiSTEM, the one described in this paper. They are divided in two
categories: the opƟmizaƟon models (OM) and the agent-based models (ABM). The table focuses on a
limited number of parƟculariƟes. For instance, there is no need to menƟon that all models integrate
uncertainƟes. The check mark does not, however, reﬂect the quality of the modeling which is leŌ to the
discreƟon of the reader. The models are diﬀerenƟated by the existence of an intraday model not nec-
essarily including an intraday market, the presence of explicit market oﬀers i.e. quanƟty and costs that
are cleared to form a price, a procedure creaƟng imbalance prices, and market zones with limited ex-
changes. A checkmark in the transparency column is earned when amodel publishes the equaƟons and
algorithms driving the behavior of the system, e.g. the opƟmizaƟon problems, the applied heurisƟcs,
etc.
In opƟmizaƟon models, a benevolent planner runs unit commitment problems integraƟng all units in
the system on a rolling horizon. These models are also called single-ﬁrm opƟmizaƟon models [41]. The
value of the residual demand, i.e. the demand minus the non-dispatchable producƟon, is updated at
each simulaƟon Ɵme step. The dual variables associated with the equality constraints between the pro-
ducƟon and the consumpƟon are taken as approximaƟon of market prices. The WILMAR model uses
this procedure to obtain day-ahead, intraday and balancing volumes by performing a unit commitment
over a 36-hour horizon rolling every three hours [40]. This model has shown that stochasƟc opƟmiza-
Ɵon results in less-costly, of the order of 0.25%, and beƩer-performing schedules than determinisƟc
opƟmizaƟon. Similar results are obtained with the stELMODmodel on an illustraƟve applicaƟon to the
German power system, also using successive rolling horizon schedules [1]. The European Commission
iniƟated the development of the energymodeling soŌwareMETIS covering the European energy system
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Table 1: Comparison of short-term electricity market models.
Ref. Name Type Intraday Market Imbalance Market Transparencymodel oﬀers seƩlement zones
[40] WILMAR OM X X X X
[1] stELMOD OM X X X
[3] METIS OM X X X X
[2] OM/ABM X X X
[29] ABM X X X
[6] PowerACE ABM X X X
[4] OPTIMATE ABM X X X X
SiSTEM OM/ABM X X X X
for electricity, gas and heat at the hourly level [3]. To tackle the complexity of the problem, unit commit-
ments are performed on clusters of producƟon units and relaxed as linear programs. The model is able
to simulate one year by opƟmizing a generaƟon plan, including both energy generaƟon and balancing
reserve supply, based on day-ahead demand and renewable generaƟon forecasts. Then, the generaƟon
plan is updated during the day, taking into account updated forecasts and technical constraints of the
assets. Finally, imbalances are drawn to simulate balancing energy procurement and post-processing of
the hourly schedule allows for the studying of balancing mechanisms.
In agent-basedmodels, there is more than one power company and explicit market clearing procedures.
Agent-based modeling is a common technique used to conduct quanƟtaƟve analyses [39]. This tech-
nique does not require making strong simplifying assumpƟons to be able to represent the system ana-
lyƟcally and to solve it [42]. The diﬀerence between an opƟmizaƟon model and an agent-based one has
been esƟmated to 2:8% of the operaƟng cost on a case study of the Central Western European system
in favor of determinisƟc unit commitment procedure by a hybrid model [2]. Loads, renewable produc-
ers and certain thermal producers are modeled in this study as submiƫng conƟnuous bids. Thermal
generators are modeled as submiƫng large exclusive bid groups, one group per generator, containing
a discreƟzed version of their generaƟon possibiliƟes for the next day. An agent-based model has been
used to quanƟfy the impact of integraƟng retailers, controlling load ﬂexibility with pay-back eﬀect, in the
day-ahead energy and reserve markets, and in imbalance seƩlement [29]. Market parƟcipants provide
explicit balancing oﬀers which are acƟvated by the system operator to balance the system at least cost,
leading to imbalance prices. The results show that the provision of reserves by ﬂexible loads has a neg-
ligible impact on the energy market prices but markedly decreases the cost of reserve procurement of
the studied system. The PowerACE agent-basedmodel is more focused on long-term capacity expansion
planning [6]. The model sƟll simulates an hourly day-ahead market with limited interconnecƟon capac-
iƟes between market zones and determines the market outcome as well as power plants dispatch. In
this model, supply and demand bidders provide basic oﬀers to the day-ahead market, single period and
no block oﬀers. This model has been applied to analyze how cross-border congesƟon management and
capacity mechanisms aﬀect welfare and generaƟon adequacy in Europe [35]. The OPTIMATE agent-
based model integrates commercial actors and system operators. SimulaƟons are run for a year at 30
to 15 minutes granularity, modeling day-ahead, intraday, real-Ɵme and ex-post processes. Commercial
actors generate and submit bids to a market-coupling enƟty. The market-coupling enƟty conducts a
net-transfer capacity-based or ﬂow-based market coupling in order to compute the accepted bids and
oﬀers. The intraday chain models successive half-hourly acƟons by the transmission system operator
and commercial actors followed by the imbalance seƩlement process. An ex-post learning module en-
ables commercial actors to improve their price forecasts, and to conduct an inventory of hydro energy
available for the hydro dams. Among other studies, the OPTIMATE model has been used to show that
there is more generaƟon curtailment using explicit balancing, i.e. using bids, than with implicit balanc-
ing, i.e. communicaƟng the characterisƟcs of the producƟon assets [9]. OPTIMATE seems to be themost
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complete model of the state of the art, yet lacking a public detailed descripƟon including the implemen-
taƟon details such as the opƟmizaƟon problem solved by the commercial actors, the market clearing
algorithm, the method to build their market oﬀers, etc.
This paper presents in detail the SiSTEMmodel, for SimulaƟon of Short-Term ElectricityMarkets, provid-
ing the mathemaƟcal problems inﬂuencing the decisions of all modeled actors. Even though the model
simulates mulƟple independent agents, no learning is used throughout the simulaƟon. SiSTEM belongs
to the category of the simulaƟon models according to the classiﬁcaƟon of [41], but not of the agent-
based one. This model is a unique combinaƟon of the strengths of previous models aiming at precisely
modeling short-termmarkets, with special care paid to balancing mechanisms and the constraints inﬂu-
encing their outcomes. In SiSTEM, each power companywith its speciﬁc porƞolio performs complex unit
commitment at a 15-minute granularity. The assets handled are thermal units, hydro-electric reservoirs
and curtailable producƟon. The thermal unit model not only integrates tradiƟonal ramping constraints,
the start-up/shut down phase and minimum on and oﬀ Ɵmes but also noƟﬁcaƟon delays inherent to
many thermal units and steady-state constraints. See SecƟon 7.1 providing the opƟmizaƟon model of
thermal units for more details. InteracƟon with the day-ahead market, the intraday market and the
system operator are conducted via bids which may be mulƟ-period with parƟal acceptance, or not, and
linked with other bids. The oﬀers-building strategy of power companies can either be porƞolio-based or
unit-based. The inﬂuences of all themodeling speciﬁcs of SiSTEM are quanƟﬁed in the results of SecƟon
5.
2. ENERGY MARKETS MODELS
This secƟon begins the descripƟon of SiSTEM, starƟng with the energy market models. Energy markets
are responsible for matching purchases and sales. An oﬀer is communicated as a bid b, consisƟng in a
cost b ine/MWh and quanƟƟes qb;t in MWh for each market period t. A single market period oﬀer has
only one qb;twhich is nonzero. By convenƟon, purchases are represented by posiƟve quanƟƟes and sales
by negaƟve quanƟƟes. Similar to what is done in pracƟce, the quanƟƟes are rounded to avoid numerical
issues. In thismodel, the quanƟƟes are rounded to the closest integer leading to aminimumexchange of
1 MWh. Note that, the minimum volume on the EPEX day-ahead energy market is 0.1 MWh. AddiƟonal
constraints may be added to these bids and are implemented in this model. In this document, binary
bids correspond to bids constrained to a binary decision, accept everything or nothing. A bid may be
restricted to be accepted only if another binary bid is accepted. These bids are respecƟvely named child
and parent bid. The model could be extended to all other type of oﬀers and constraints. For instance,
the European day-ahead energy market integrates many more diﬀerent products [17].
2.1. Day-ahead energy market
The European day-ahead energy market clears the day before the delivering day. Typically, the gate
closure for submiƫng bids occurs at 12:00 and results are provided one hour later. The clearing of the
market aims at maximizing the global welfare of the market. In this model, the clearing is formulated
using a primal-dual formulaƟon inspired from [27] and [2]. The actual day-aheadmarket clearing is based







C(b) Child bids of block bid b 2 Bb
T Market Ɵme steps
Parameters
b Cost of bid b
Mb Modeling constant to prevent accepted oﬀers with negaƟve surplus.
qb;t Volume of bid b in Ɵme step t
[min; max] Market price range
Selling bids take posiƟve quanƟƟes and buying bids take negaƟve quanƟƟes.
Variables
xb Acceptance of bid b
t Market price of Ɵme step t











qb;txb = 0 8t 2 T [t] (1b)
xb  1 8b 2 B [sb] (1c)
xb2  xb1 8b1 2 Bb; b2 2 C(b1) [sb2 ] (1d)


























with t 2 [min; max]; 8t 2 T ; sb 2 R+;8b 2 B.
The formulaƟon (1) is a primal-dual formulaƟon where the primal problem is given by (1a)-(1d). The
objecƟve funcƟon (1a) maximizes the welfare. The equality between accepted purchases and sales is
enforced by constraint (1b). Constraint (1d) enforces the link between bids.
The dual part of the formulaƟon (1e)-(1g) allows one to deﬁne the prices in the same opƟmizaƟon prob-
lem. The dual variables associated to each primal constraint are given in brackets within the primal
problem. The price in a market period is given by the dual variable associated to the balance constraint
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(1b). The surplus of a non-binary bid is deﬁned by inequality (1e). Note that if the bid is linked, this sur-
plus is decreased by the price of its link with its parent. The surplus of a binary bids is given by inequality
(1f) which includes the possibility to reject an oﬀer if accepƟng it leads to a negaƟve surplus. This pos-
sibility requires one to take the constantMb large enough, e.g. Mb = (max   min)
P
t2T jqb;tj. The
equality of the primal and dual objecƟve funcƟon of the day-ahead energy market is ensured by (1g).
2.2. Intraday market
In most European countries, the real intraday market is a conƟnuous market where oﬀers are updated
conƟnuously by the market parƟcipants. In this model, the intraday market is implemented by market
sessions taking place every simulaƟon Ɵme step. The intraday market is cleared using opƟmizaƟon
problem (1). Note that the laƩer problem is ﬂexible with respect to the number of market periods
or their duraƟon. AŌer the clearing of the day-ahead market, the intraday market opens for the next
day, e.g. at 19:00. In every simulaƟon Ɵme step, the intraday market ﬁrst clears the opened intraday
market period. For instance, the clearing at 8:00 clears the period from 9:00 to 24:00 of the same day.
The one occurring at 20:00 clears the period from 21:00 of the current day to 24:00 of the next day.
These procedures provide a price for each intraday period at each clear intraday market clearing. An
indicaƟve intraday price is built for a given delivery Ɵme step by taking the weighted average over the
volumes exchanged in each intraday clearing, including the Ɵme step. At the end of the market session,
the current intraday Ɵme stepmay includemore than one simulaƟon Ɵme step. Considering a half-hour-
based intraday market, a product in this market covers two simulaƟon Ɵme steps.
3. POWER COMPANY MODEL
Power companies are actors of the electrical system which manage the producƟon units and the con-
sumpƟon. Each power company aims atmaximizing its proﬁt given its ownporƞolio of assets and clients.
The model considers producers as power companies without consumpƟon and retailers as power com-
panies without producƟon assets. To maximize their proﬁts, power companies conƟnuously update
their schedules and oﬀers in the markets. In the model, decisions are updated in each simulaƟon Ɵme
step in four phases: forecasƟng, dispatching, trading and communicaƟng balancing capacity.
To make its decisions, a power company needs forecasts. For instance, forecasted exogenous quanƟƟes
are the consumpƟon and producƟon from renewable energies such aswind, photo-voltaic or run-of-the-
river hydro-electricity. Using its own forecasts, a power company decides which assets to use to produce
the necessary energy to cover its consumpƟon and sales. This scheduling phase is computaƟonally
challenging since it requires opƟmizing the output of each asset taking into account its constraints on a
potenƟally large horizon. In pracƟce, the schedule of the porƞolio for awhole day does not change every
minute, it would be too computaƟonally demanding and would need too many human intervenƟons.
Scheduling is therefore divided into two parts in the model: short-term and long-term scheduling. They
are both performed with the same resoluƟon in this model, e.g. 15 minutes to study the impact of
balancing. Short-term scheduling modiﬁes the schedule of the assets over one or two hours and is
performed in every simulaƟon Ɵme step. Short-term scheduling is used to take into account the latest
accepted intraday market oﬀers, unƟl the ﬁnal schedule, and the acƟvaƟon of balancing. Long-term
scheduling allows the integraƟon of day-ahead market exchanges and aims at esƟmaƟng how to saƟsfy
the demand at the lowest cost in parƟcular using assets with a lot of inerƟa. For instance, starƟng a coal
producƟon unit requires it running to keep for at least eight hours and its high start-up cost favors an
even longer period. In the model, power companies perform long-term unit commitment before and
aŌer the opening of the day-ahead energy market, at the opening of the intraday market, and before
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and aŌer the short-term reserve mechanism clearing and every four hours. The resulƟng producƟon
schedule describes how the power company intends to produce energy to saƟsfy its consumpƟon and
its exchanges. This schedule can be used as reference to compute how much the power company can
increase its producƟon and at what cost. This reference also provides the cost of energy producƟon and
therefore at which price the company is willing to buy energy to avoid using its own producƟon assets.
The reference therefore allows for the compuƟng of the ﬂexibility of the power company which can be
either oﬀered on the diﬀerent markets or communicated to the system operator for balancing.
This secƟon details how acƟons of a power company are modeled. The generaƟon of forecasts feeding
the scheduling model is detailed in SecƟon 3.1. The general opƟmizaƟon model of units-scheduling
is formulated in SecƟon 3.2. The general method to obtain the ﬂexibility of a producƟon unit and to
communicate it as oﬀers for the day-aheadmarket, intradaymarket and balancing capacity procurement
is described in SecƟon 3.4. A porƞolio-based alternaƟve is given in SecƟon 3.5. How this ﬂexibility is
proposed in the markets is detailed in SecƟon 3.3. The speciﬁc models of the producƟon assets are
given in the Appendix. The model of thermal units is described in SecƟon 7.1 and includes on-oﬀ status,
ramping constraints, minimum on, oﬀ and steady-state Ɵme and noƟﬁcaƟon delays. The hydro-electric
reservoirs porƞoliomodel is given in SecƟon 7.2. The total stock is divided in a ﬁnite number of reservoirs
with their own constraints. A total stock constraint links them together. The producƟon cost is given by
a stock value computed as a funcƟon of the stock level. Curtailable producƟon is modeled in SecƟon
7.3, with a maximum realizaƟon changing with the forecasts.
3.1. Forecasts
The target producƟon schedule of a power company is given by the sum of its exchanges and forecasts
of the consumpƟon and the non-dispatchable producƟon including, in parƟcular, the renewable pro-
ducƟon. In this model, their predicƟons are generated from their realizaƟons which are given as input
to the model. The predicƟon error is modeled as evolving from a maximum error, obtained for a delay
of T , to a minimum error in real-Ɵme. The maximum error signal is generated by taking a random sig-
nal around the realizaƟon, smoothed by convoluƟon with a Hanning window. A forecast of minimum
error is generated using the same method. In the implementaƟon, the length of the default smoothing
window used by a power company is given by bW/10 + 4e, whereW is the number of simulaƟon Ɵme
steps per day.
The forecast error decreases with Ɵme, according to a logarithmic funcƟon, toward a forecast of mini-
mum error, p^bt , given by a Gaussian law. The predicƟon evolves from the worst forecast p^wt achieved in
t T of the realizaƟon pt, to the best forecast, p^bt achieved in t. One last parameter provides the relaƟve
decay of the error , arbitrarily set by default to 0:05. This evoluƟon is inﬂuenced by the constant T and













The default parameters in the implementaƟon deﬁne amaximumerror of 10%obtained 16 hours before
real-Ɵme that decreases to 3%. Due to the smoothing processes, the actual error obtained diﬀers from
these parameters. To give an order of magnitude, the generated forecast error in day-ahead of a con-
sumpƟon signal ranged from 0 to 9.53% with an average of 2.47%. The error one hour before real-Ɵme
ranged from 0 to 1.94% with an average of 1.47%.
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3.2. Units-scheduling and balancing strategy
The units-scheduling task is to coordinate the producƟon of individual units to reach a coherent schedule
Qt at minimal cost. The target schedule Qt includes the forecasts detailed in SecƟon 3.1, the energy
exchanged on the markets and the balancing acƟvaƟon of the system operator. This coordinaƟon is
performed by solving the opƟmizaƟon problem (3), tradiƟonally known as a unit commitment problem.
Three parƟculariƟes of this formulaƟon areworth highlighƟng. First, problem (3) is solved by each power
company independently to reﬂect the current pracƟce in the European electrical system. The problem
is not solved by the system operator which has no direct control over the producƟon units. Second, the
target power to producemay be diﬀerent from the consumpƟon, in parƟcular to include exchanges with
other market parƟcipants. Third, the soluƟon may deviate from the target schedule. The importance
and occurrence of these deviaƟons depends on the balancing strategy of the power company. This





Xi ProducƟon units constraints
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Ci(pi) Cost funcƟon of the producƟon unit
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t 8t 2 T (3h)
with (pi;t; b+i;t; b i;t) 2 R+R+R ; 8(i; t) 2 U T ; (D+t ;K+t ; D t ;K t ) 2 (R+)2 (R )2; 8t 2 T ;
(I+s ; I
 
s ) 2 R+  R ; 8s 2 S .
The individual constraints of the producƟon units are summarized by equaƟon (3b) where for each unit
i, pi is the vector of power output through Ɵme and Xi the set of constraints speciﬁc to the unit. The
details ofXi for each type of producƟon unit are available in the Appendix. Power balance is ensured by
equality (3c), also compuƟng the deviaƟon in each Ɵme step. The deviaƟon is deﬁned as the diﬀerence in
one simulaƟon Ɵme step between the target schedule and the soluƟon schedule. EquaƟon (3d) deﬁnes
an imbalance as the average of the deviaƟons over an imbalance period. Balancing strategy may be
reﬁned by deﬁning important deviaƟons, i.e. deviaƟons above a given threshold, as expressed by (3e)-
(3f). The objecƟve funcƟon jointly minimizes producƟon and imbalance costs and penalizes important
deviaƟons. The reserve that the power company must provide is dispatched between the units of its
porƞolio using the coupling constraints (3g)-(3h).
The balancing strategy of the actor, i.e. the compromise the actor makes between following its schedule
and relying on the imbalance mechanism, is determined by the following parameters. The upward and
downward imbalance costs, +s ;  s , quanƟfy the ﬁnancial incenƟve for the power company to balance
itself. For instance, if the downward imbalance cost is lower than a producƟon cost, the soluƟon of the
opƟmizaƟon problem favors a deviaƟon. However, the power company will avoid important deviaƟons
assuming the prices set for them are important. A deviaƟon is qualiﬁed as important if it is respecƟvely
above or below the reference powers L+t and L t .
Two diﬀerent balancing strategies are implemented: a no-imbalance strategy and a price-based strategy.
In the ﬁrst one, imbalance prices forecast which are used by the power company in its unit commitment
are very conservaƟve, which corresponds to a risk-averse behaviour. Before the clearing of the day-
ahead market the forecasts are set to 3000 e/MWh for a downward imbalance and -3000 e/MWh for
an upward imbalance. In the intraday, the company uses pessimisƟc values of the imbalance prices,
arbitrarily set to 300 e/MWh for a downward imbalance and -1 e/MWh for an upward imbalance.
The secondbalancing strategy is amore risk-taking one. In this intenƟonal-imbalance strategy, the power
company use the current imbalance prices as reference for its forecasts if the current system imbalance is
signiﬁcant. An imbalance is considered signiﬁcant if it is larger than 50%of the systemoperator balancing
requirements and the imbalance is increasing. This 50% is the default parameter of a power company
and can change in funcƟon of the simulated instance. For the next hour and half, the power company
uses the current posiƟve and negaƟve imbalance prices, i+ and i , the current system imbalance I
to compute the parameters of the balancing strategy as follows:
+b =
i+   ji+j   1 (4a)
 b =




where is the relaƟvemixed-integer programming gap tolerance used to solve the opƟmizaƟonproblem
(3).
3.3. Energy markets interacƟons
In the model, oﬀers to the day-ahead market are submiƩed in the Ɵme step right before the clearing of
the market. These oﬀers can be built unit-based or porƞolio-based. The two strategies are respecƟvely
described in SecƟons 3.4 and 3.5. In either case, the reference schedule considered is obtained by
performing an iniƟal units-scheduling where the power company saƟsﬁes its own consumpƟon using
its producƟon units. The porƟon of the producƟon or consumpƟon which is not covered by the units
is oﬀered to the day-ahead market as buying or selling oﬀers at a cost corresponding to the forecast
of the imbalance price, see SecƟon 3.2. Other alternaƟves could be considered, such as taking a zero
reference which may imply buying its own producƟon on the market to saƟsfy its own consumpƟon. A
more complex one would be to predict the volume that will be traded on the day-aheadmarket and add
them to the consumpƟon to obtain a centered reference around the most likely market seƩlement.
Oﬀers to the intraday market are built unit-based since it concerns signiﬁcantly smaller volumes and
therefore may be more impacted by the minimum producƟon constraint of some producƟon units. A
power company also needs to take into account the Ɵme needed to adjust its schedule once the oﬀer
is accepted. Therefore, availability of oﬀers depends on the neutralizaƟon delay and the noƟce delay
of the producƟon unit if relevant. In the implementaƟon, if any Ɵme step of an intraday market period
is neutralized in the next simulaƟon Ɵme step, the power company makes no oﬀers in this market Ɵme
step. Any unit with a noƟce delay increases this eﬀect by the corresponding amount of simulaƟon Ɵme
step.
3.4. Unit-based oﬀers
To interact with themarkets, a power company needs to be able to compute the ﬂexibility of a given unit
with respect to its reference schedule. The Ɵme horizon on which this ﬂexibility is computed depends
on the target market. The following details the generic method to compute the ﬂexibility of a unit in
a given Ɵme step on any trading period. The trading period can include more than one trading Ɵme
step and consequently many simulaƟon Ɵme steps. Speciﬁc applicaƟons to the diﬀerent markets are
speciﬁed aŌerwards.
The unit-based ﬂexibility module is responsible for providing a list of bids valid on the trading period
for a given unit. The following explains the process to build bids for upward ﬂexibility. The process to
obtain downward ﬂexibility oﬀers is symmetric. The quanƟty of available upward ﬂexibility for unit i is
obtained by taking the diﬀerence between the reference schedule pi and the maximum producƟon of
the unit p+i . This maximum depends on the schedule outside of the trading period and can be obtained
by solving the following opƟmizaƟon problem.
Sets
H Trading Ɵme steps
Xi ProducƟon units constraints
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Parameters
pi;T start Scheduled power output in the Ɵme step before the ﬁrst trading Ɵme step
pi;T end Scheduled power output in the Ɵme step aŌer the last trading Ɵme step
b+i;t; b
 
i;t Upward and downward balancing capacity of the unit
Variables
p+i;t Power output of a unit







p+i;T start = pi;T start (5b)
p+
i;T end = pi;T end (5c)
(p+i ; bi) 2 Xi (5d)
with p+i;t 2 R;8t 2 T . The iniƟal power output of the unit is deﬁned by (5b). Equality (5c) imposes
that the unit returns to its schedule aŌer the trading period. Finally, (5d) impose that the modulaƟon
saƟsﬁes the unit constraints recycling the unit model Xi deﬁned in scheduling problem (3).
The ﬂexibility of a producƟon unit is given by the diﬀerence between the iniƟal schedule and the alterna-
Ɵve schedule. By default, the ﬂexibility in each trading Ɵme step is oﬀered as in independent bid which
can be parƟally accepted at a cost equal to the variable cost of the producƟon unit. ParƟculariƟes of
oﬀers building for each type of producƟon units is detailed in their respecƟve secƟon in the Appendix. In
parƟcular, thermal producƟon units require making block oﬀers, oﬀers covering more than one trading
Ɵme step, and links between the oﬀers.
3.5. Porƞolio-based oﬀers
Porƞolio-based oﬀers are generated based on a predeﬁned number of generaƟon scenarios. The algo-
rithm is composed of the following steps. First, it performs three units-scheduling with three diﬀerent
targets: minimum producƟon, maximum producƟon and geƫng as close as possible to the reference
scenario. Intermediate scenarios are then generated in between these three scenarios, twenty addi-
Ɵonal scenarios by default. Units-scheduling in these scenarios provides the closest possible volumes
and the associated costs. Theses volumes and costs are then divided into individual oﬀers for each
market Ɵme step. The reference scenario is considered as a base to deﬁne the ﬂexibility oﬀers and is
arbitrarily set to the forecast of the consumpƟon. Volumes above this reference are converted into sell-
ing oﬀers. The diﬀerence in volume between the ﬁrst scenario above the reference and the reference
volume is oﬀered at the diﬀerence of total cost between the two scenarios divided by the diﬀerence
of volume over the whole horizon. The process is repeated for the next scenarios taking the diﬀerence
with the previous ones. Sales are generated using the symmetric process. Note that this algorithm only
generates bids on single trading periods that can be parƟally accepted. No blocks are generated by this
procedure. The target schedule resulƟng from the clearing of the energy market may be diﬃcult to fol-
low by the producƟon assets’ porƞolio. This bidding strategy is therefore opƟmisƟc compared to the
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possibility granted by the dynamic constraints of the producƟon units. For this reason, the porƞolio-
based ﬂexibility is meant to be used by power companies controlling a suﬃciently large porƞolio of
producƟon units.
4. BALANCING MECHANISMMODEL
This secƟon details the balancing mechanism from the point of view of the system operator. The model
focuses on the balancing energy from the frequency restoraƟon reserve and the replacement reserve.
The implemented reserve mechanisms are described in SecƟon 4.1. SecƟon 4.2 describes the forecast
of the future imbalances of the system. The acƟvaƟon process of the balancing capacity is described in
SecƟon 4.3 and the following imbalance seƩlement in SecƟon 4.4.
4.1. Balancing reserve procurement
Balancing reserve procurement rules diﬀer from one European country to another. Diﬀerent types of
reserve, i.e. manual or automaƟc frequency restoraƟon reserves or replacement reserves, are con-
tracted with diﬀerent delays [13]. For instance, Spanish automaƟc frequency restoraƟon reserves and
replacement reserves are contracted on the day-ahead. French manual frequency restoraƟon reserves
and replacement reserves are contracted one year ahead. Reserve obligaƟons are oŌen contracted
with an actor and may be the object of bilateral exchanges with other power companies as long as they
are cerƟﬁed by the system operator. Currently, short-term reserves in Europe are mostly contracted
via organized markets which may sƟll lead to bilateral contracts [13]. The rules used by system opera-
tors to deﬁne their capacity requirements change from one system to another. Review [30] provides a
comparison of operaƟng pracƟce of system operators.
In this model, two mechanisms are implemented to model balancing reserve procurement. The sim-
plest is long-term unit-based reserves included in the model as a mandatory capacity to be able to be
produced or consumed by a given unit. Power companies include these volumes as constraints when
providing the schedule of their unit. The amount of reserve is an input parameter of themodel. The sys-
tem operator considers that reserves should be as available for acƟvaƟon on a single balancing period
and can be parƟally acƟvated without any noƟﬁcaƟon delay.
The second implementaƟon is a day-ahead balancing reserve procurement. This variant is also equiva-
lent to modeling the results of a long-term porƞolio-based reservaƟon followed by bilateral exchanges
between producers. The reserved capaciƟes provided by each power company are obtained by an iter-
aƟve process where the system operator reserve requirements are given as parameters. In an iteraƟon,
the system operator sets upward and downward reserve prices. Given these prices and the reserve
requirements, power companies communicate the reserve they are willing to provide. If this reserve
is below the requirements, reserve prices are increased, otherwise they are decreased. The minimum
reserve price is set to 1 e/MW/h. With a price of 0 e/MW/h in this model, power companies would
have no incenƟve to propose their ﬂexibility to the system operator and instead keep it for themselves.
The day-ahead reserve prices deﬁniƟon process can be seen as a black-box opƟmizaƟon problem with
important disconƟnuiƟes. These disconƟnuiƟes mainly come from the start-up constraint of thermal
units. If the reserve price allows one to cover the start-up cost of a unit scheduled to be oﬀ, all its re-
maining capacity becomes available as reserve. Algorithm 1 describes one procedure to deﬁne the up-
ward reserve price for a given reserve Ɵme step. It takes as parameters the required capacity of reserve
R and the default reserve price increment, e.g. 50e/MW/h. The extension tomulƟple Ɵme steps and
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downward reserve is straighƞorward and omiƩed for clarity and conciseness. This algorithm is inspired
from the paƩern search method tuned to this problem, in parƟcular to deal with the disconƟnuiƟes and
the necessity to reach the reserve requirements. This process may be computaƟonally expensive since
it requires at each iteraƟon for each power company to compute a schedule. To maintain reasonable
computaƟon eﬀorts, the maximum number of iteraƟon is set to 20 with a tolerance of 10 MW on the
reserve capacity and a 2 e/MW/h tolerance on the reserve prices are used to stop iteraƟng.
1: procedure RÝÙò ÖÙ®Ý(R;)
2: k;;V0; 1; 1; 0 . IniƟal iteraƟon, reserve prices and volumes
3: while k Maximum number of iteraƟons do
4: Vk  Pa2power companies reserve(a;) . Compute reserve obtained from prices
5: for all t 2reserve periods do
6: t  t/2 if
Rt   V kt   Rt   V k 1t  else 1:5t . Update price variaƟon
7: t  t + t if V kt < Rt else t . Update reserve price
8: end for
9: k  k + 1
10: end while
11: end procedure
Algorithm 1: Reserve market price deﬁniƟon algorithm from the required reserve volume R and a de-
fault reserve price increment .
To parƟcipate in the modeled short-term reserve market, a power company needs to provide reserve
quanƟƟes corresponding to reserve prices. These quanƟƟes may be obtained by solving a modiﬁed
version of problem (3). The modiﬁed version (6) aims at determining the quanƟƟes of reserve R+t , R t
for each reserve Ɵme step t based on the reserve prices +t and  t . These quanƟƟes are restricted by
the maximum amount that could be bought by the system operator R?+t; R t .
Sets
S Balancing periods
T SimulaƟon Ɵme steps
T r Reserve Ɵme steps
U ProducƟon units
Xi ProducƟon units constraints
Parameters
Ci(pi) Cost funcƟon of the producƟon unit
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K+t  D+t   L+t 8t 2 T (6e)
K t  D t   L t 8t 2 T (6f)X
i2U
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i2U
b i;t  R t 8t 2 T r (6h)
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4.2. System imbalance forecast
A proacƟve system operator needs to forecast the future system imbalances to take proacƟve acƟons.
These forecasts must capture the needs to acƟvate block oﬀers ahead of Ɵme for major imbalances,
while prevenƟng as much as possible the need for costly counter-acƟvaƟon aŌerwards. Note that one
important component of the imbalance is the forecast error. Therefore, forecasƟng imbalance roughly
corresponds to forecasƟng a forecast error which should, by construcƟon, be zero on average. In this
model, the system operator directly forecasts the balance of the whole system rather than forecasƟng
the consumpƟon as in secƟon 3.1 and subtracƟng the planned producƟon. The system operator builds
a scenario tree around the trend of observed system imbalances. The observed imbalances not only
include the sum of forecast errors of the actors, but also outages, diﬀerences between schedules and
exchanged energies due to the minimum volume accuracy of energy markets, etc. This scenario tree is
used in the balancing acƟvaƟon process described in SecƟon 4.3.
A scenario tree of system imbalance forecasts is built in two steps. First, a most credible scenario is
predicted. Many methods can be used to deﬁne a most credible scenario such as taking a 0 future im-
balance, unchanged imbalance or linear regression as depicted in Figure 4. The default method used
in this model is to take the average of the past imbalances. This baseline is adapted with the outages
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informaƟon to improve the accuracy of the forecast. Based on this most credible scenario, two others
are generated: one above and one below the most credible. Based on these three scenarios, the sce-
nario tree is built by creaƟng, for each node, at most three children corresponding to the three base
scenarios. This procedure is illustrated in Figure 4. From the system imbalance realizaƟons, the system
operator generates a trajectory of system imbalance given by the doƩed line in the example. Based on
this trajectory, the system operator generates two addiƟonal scenarios, one above and one below, to
capture credible deviaƟons. The implementaƟon arbitrarily places them at 75% and 125% of the base
trajectory. The black lines represent the links between the nodes of the scenario tree. Note that a node
in Figure 4 may correspond to mulƟple nodes in the scenario tree since past acƟons must be taken into
account.
Timett  1t  2 t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3
Past Current
Figure 4: Forecast of the future system imbalance as a scenario tree.
4.3. Balancing acƟvaƟon
Knowing the current system imbalance, the system operator selects the ﬂexibiliƟes to acƟvate from the
available balancing capacity. To make its decisions, the system operator considers their impact on the
future Ɵme steps of the system. The maximum horizon on which the system operator can acƟvate bal-
ancing energy is named the operaƟonal window. A system operator only acƟng in one balancing period
is named reacƟve since it only observes the current imbalance and acƟvates the opposite energy vol-
ume. A proacƟve system operator ﬁrst forecasts imbalance scenarios then acƟvates balancing energy
based on decisions taken previously. Note that this is also valid for decisions taken in the future. Deci-
sions taken for three Ɵme steps further depend on the ones taken two Ɵme steps before now. Note the
plural which implies that there are mulƟple decision states in one Ɵme step and their dependence must
be handled by non-anƟcipatory constraints.
Power companies communicate all the ﬂexibility resulƟng from their schedule to the system operator
and the corresponding acƟvaƟon cost in the following simulaƟon Ɵme steps. In this model, this ﬂexibil-
ity is communicated as bids similar to the day-ahead and intraday markets. AcƟvaƟon of bids is subject
to various constraints. Binary decisions, links and exclusions need to be considered. In pracƟce, this
complexity is ignored by some system operators and only basic products are considered. An addiƟonal
constraint imposes a noƟﬁcaƟon delay before the acƟvaƟon of some bids. These delays are communi-
cated by the power companies to integrate reacƟon delays and constraints of their producƟon units. An
addiƟonal constraint is added to this model for oﬀers named “security bids”. These bids are limited to
be used only in the opposite direcƟon of the predicted system imbalance. For instance, a nuclear pro-
ducƟon unit can provide a reserve if its set point is not altered by much. The balancing capacity coming
from the reservaƟon of such units should therefore only be used for security purposes.
Power companies also communicate the outages of their thermal producƟon plants: themissing energy
producƟon and the outage’s duraƟon. The duraƟon is capped by the neutralizaƟon delay since the
actor is responsible for changing its schedule or buying the missing energy on the markets outside of
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the neutralized period. The implementaƟon takes a Ɵme series of outages as input described by the
noƟﬁcaƟon Ɵme, the duraƟon and themaximumavailability of the unit. If a unit is producing and faces a
parƟal outage, the producƟon of the unit decreases to amaximumavailable power given as a parameter.
The objecƟve of the system operator in this phase is to balance the system at least cost. This obviously
implies acƟvaƟng the upward ﬂexibility with the least cost and the downward ﬂexibility with the highest
cost. The system operator may therefore perform economic counter-acƟvaƟons i.e. acƟvate two bids
that cancel each other out if the downward cost is higher than the upward cost. The laƩer may be
prevented in some countries and in the model. The default choice in the implementaƟon is to allow
the system operator economic counter-acƟvaƟons, therefore improving the economic eﬃciency of the
system. Note that counter-acƟvaƟons are not always economic and can come from the compensaƟon
of proacƟve acƟons taken using a bad forecast of the system imbalance.
OpƟmizaƟon problem (7) provides the decisions of balancing acƟvaƟons similar to what a decision sup-





L Links between bids (b1; b2) 2 Bb  B such that acƟvaƟon of b1 is mandatory to
acƟvate b2
E AcƟvaƟon exclusive bids (b1; b2) 2 Bb  Bb
N Nodes of the scenario tree
Nt Nodes of the scenario tree in Ɵme step t
Nn;t Children of node n in Ɵme step t
T Time steps
T0 Time steps except the current one
Node 0 corresponds to the root of the scenario tree.
Parameters
A(n; k) Ancestor node 2 N of node n of degree k. The parent of node n is A(n; 1).
b AcƟvaƟon cost
 Penalty of the predicted residual imbalance of the system
0 Penalty of the residual imbalance in the root node of the scenario tree
In Total imbalance of the system
M+t ;M
 
t Maximum upward and downward available balancing capacity for acƟvaƟon
!n Probability of a node
qb;t Volume of bid b 2 Bb in Ɵme step t
b AcƟvaƟon Ɵme step of a bid b
vt AcƟvated balancing volume by previous decisions
Upward capaciƟes are taken posiƟve and represents an increase of the producƟon or a decrease of the




n Residual upward and downward imbalance of the system
b+n ; b
 
n AcƟvated upward and downward balancing volume



























qb;tyb;A(n;t b) 8t 2 T ; n 2 Nt (7c)
b+n +minf0; Ing   M t 8t 2 8t 2 T0; n 2 Nt (7d)









n 8t 2 T ; n 2 Nt (7f)
yb2;n2  yb1;n1 8(b1; b2) 2 L; (n1; n2) 2 Nb1 Nb2 (7g)
yb;A(n;t b) = 0 8t 2 T ; n 2 Nt; b 2 Bn : qb;tIn > 0 (7h)X
b2Ba:qb;t>0
qb;tyb;A(n;t b)   In 8t 2 T ; n 2 Nt : In < 0 (7i)X
b2Ba:qb;t<0
 qb;tyb;A(n;t b)  In 8t 2 T ; n 2 Nt : In > 0 (7j)
yb1;n1 + yb2;n2  1 8(b1; b2) 2 E : b1  b2 ; n1 2 Nb1 ; n2 2 Nn1;b2 (7k)
yb1;n1 + yb2;n2  1 8(b1; b2) 2 E : b1 > b2 ; n2 2 Nb2 ; n2 2 Nn2;b1 (7l)
with yb;n 2 [0; 1]; 8b 2 Bc; n 2 Nb ; yb;n 2 f0; 1g;8b 2 Bb; n 2 Nb and i+n ; i n 2 R+  R ; 8n 2 N .
ObjecƟve (7a) minimizes the acƟvaƟon costs while minimizing the remaining imbalance of the system.
The default parameter for the penalƟes of the remaining imbalance are set to the imbalance price cap
except for the root node, arbitrarily chosen at 20000e/MWh. This choice of parameters expresses that
ensuring the balance in the current Ɵme step is criƟcal for security. On the other hand, the other nodes
are predicƟons and could not become a realizaƟon. Making this diﬀerence is parƟcularly important if the
solver is stopped before reaching the opƟmal soluƟon. The upward and downward acƟvated balancing
volumes in node n are computed by (7b) and (7c). Constraints (7d)-(7e) limit the balancing volumes
acƟvated in future Ɵme steps to avoid large counter acƟvaƟons. The implementaƟon arbitrarily chooses
Mt such that at least 25% of the available balancing capacity and the minimum balancing requirements
cannot be counter-acƟvated. The residual system imbalance is computed by (7f). The links between
bids are enforced by inequality (7g). Security bids may not be acƟvated in the same direcƟon as the
imbalance of the system by constraint (7h). If these bids are in the same direcƟon, constraints (7i)-(7j)
also restrict the acƟvated volume to be less than the forecasted imbalance.
4.4. Imbalance seƩlement
A legal enƟty responsible for the balance of its intakes and oﬀ-takes is called a balancing responsible
party [12]. In this model, each power company is considered as its own balancing responsible party. In
pracƟce, mulƟple power companies may form a single balancing responsible party. Balancing acƟva-
Ɵon costs and revenues are redistributed among the balancing responsible parƟes, power companies in
this model, proporƟonally to their imbalance volume. This imbalance volume is given by the diﬀerence
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between the realizaƟon of the balancing responsible party and its net posiƟon. The net posiƟon is com-
puted by the balancing responsible party and communicated to the systemoperator at the neutralizaƟon
delay. This posiƟon should correspond to the result of its exchanges with other market parƟcipants. A
power company producing all the necessary energy to saƟsfy its consumpƟon would therefore have a
zero net posiƟon. A power company receives money if it produces more than its net posiƟon and pays
out if it produces less than its net posiƟon. The amount of money received or paid is proporƟonal to
the posiƟve and negaƟve imbalance prices respecƟvely. The volume of imbalance is deﬁned by the en-
ergy diﬀerence between the net posiƟon and the realizaƟon. The laƩer net posiƟon corresponds to the
posiƟon of the actor directly resulƟng from its commercial exchanges of ﬂexibility at the neutralizaƟon
delay before real-Ɵme. The imbalance volume is corrected by the system operator with the balancing
acƟvaƟons which are not considered as imbalances. This energy diﬀerence is computed by averaging
the power diﬀerence over an imbalance seƩlement period. For instance, Figure 5 shows an imbalance
seƩlement over two simulaƟon Ɵme steps.
Time
12 : 00 12 : 30 DeviaƟon
Imbalance
Figure 5: DeﬁniƟon of the imbalance by averaging the average deviaƟon of an actor over an imbalance
seƩlement period of half an hour.
Imbalance prices are computed in the model at the end of each imbalance seƩlement period. In prac-
Ɵce, there can be a delay before the publicaƟon of these prices. Imbalances may be invoiced months
later and gradually corrected over the year with the collecƟon of electricity meter data. There are two
main categories of imbalance seƩlement mechanism: single and dual pricing. In a single price imbal-
ance seƩlement, posiƟve and negaƟve imbalance prices are equal and depend on the cost of acƟvated
balancing assets. In a dual price imbalance seƩlement, the imbalance price for power companies pe-
nalizing the system is a funcƟon of the cost of acƟvated balancing assets, whereas the price for power
companies helping the system is a funcƟon of the day-ahead market price. Table 2 provides one imbal-
ance seƩlement rule used by the French system operator. Note that this rule corresponds neither to a
single price nor a dual price imbalance seƩlement. Each column corresponds to one state of the system:
long with more injecƟons than oﬀ-takes and short with less injecƟons than oﬀ-takes.
Imbalance System balance
price Long Short
PosiƟve min (A  (1  k) ; A  (1 + k)) min (A+ (1  k) ; A+ (1 + k))
NegaƟve max (A  (1  k) ; A  (1 + k)) max (A+ (1  k) ; A+ (1 + k))
Table 2: Imbalance seƩlement rule used by the French system operator whereA+ andA  respecƟvely
are the upward and downward average weighted cost of the acƟvated balancing assets and k a coeﬃ-
cient deﬁned to balance incomes and expenditures from balancing acƟons.
5. RESULTS
This secƟon presents results on a ﬁcƟve base case presented in SecƟon 5.1. The results of its simulaƟon
are given in SecƟon 5.2. The sensiƟvity of the results with respect to the simulaƟon bias is evaluated
in SecƟon 5.3. In the other result secƟons, a limited number of parameters are changed to evaluate
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their impact. SecƟons 5.4 - 5.6 compare diﬀerent market designs or quanƟfy the impact of relaxing one
modeling assumpƟon. AddiƟonal results are presented in Appendix 8. Table 3 provides a summary of
the parameters changed in the results with respect to the base case. These results only aim at illustraƟng
the capabiliƟes of the model. To provide accurate and detailed messages on market designs, one would
need to perform more than one simulaƟon per studied case. Since the outputs of such simulaƟons are
numerous and very detailed, the results focus only on noteworthy changes. Time series, such as prices
or imbalance volumes, are described by their median, to be more robust to outliers, and their standard
deviaƟon.
The model is implemented in Python 3 using the Pyomo library [25]. The simulaƟons are performed
on a computer equipped with an Intel Xeon CPU E5-2697 v3 at 2.6 GHz, 64 GB of RAM, Python 3.5.2
and CPLEX 12.6 with a Ɵme limit for each opƟmizaƟon problem of 600 seconds and a mixed-integer gap
tolerance of 5%, except for energy market clearings which are solved to opƟmality.
5.1. DescripƟon of the base case
ProducƟon assets and the consumpƟon are managed by four diﬀerent power companies. Actor 1 is a
producer and a retailer operaƟng all the nuclear power plants and the majority of hydro-electric reser-
voirs’ capacity. Actor 2 is a producer and a retailer operaƟng a coal power plant and two combined-cycle
gas turbines and a small capacity of hydro-electric reservoirs. Actor 3 is a retailer with no generaƟon
asset and actor 4 a renewable energy producer. Their market shares are given in Table 4. All oﬀers
provided by the power companies are unit-based except the oﬀers built by actor 1 for the day-ahead
market which is assumed to rely on porƞolio bidding. All power companies use the risk-averse balancing
strategy described in SecƟon 3.2.
CapaciƟes of Table 4 are divided into producƟon units following the parameters of Table 5. Variable
costs are consistent with [26]. Start-up costs of nuclear plants are inferred from reference [37]. Other
values, in parƟcular constraints’ parameters, are arbitrary choices taken for illustraƟve purposes and can
diﬀer signiﬁcantly from actual values. There are two types of nuclear plants, two of combined-cycle gas
turbines (CCGT), one of open-cycle gas turbine (OCGT) and one small-size coal power plant. Variable
costs of the units are drawn from 5%-wide uniform distribuƟon around values given in Table 5. The
parameters of their outages are given in Table 6. The deraƟngs correspond to outages adequate for the
scale of the system, i.e. 300MW. The variable cost of the renewable producƟon is arbitrarily set to zero.
Dispatchable hydro-electric producƟon from reservoirs is divided into twoparts, themanually-controlled
one and the remote-controlled one. The only diﬀerence between the two is the delay of noƟce which is
respecƟvely of three hours and ﬁve minutes. Their infeeds and bounds are taken from French historical
data and scaled to match the installed capaciƟes given in Table 4. The bounds on the stock supplies
ensure a coherent management of the reservoirs on the long term. The average hourly infeed of the
reservoirs is 116 MWh. Their stock values may vary between 20 and 120 e/MWh with an average
sensiƟvity of 0.283 ce/(MWh)2. The economic impact of the ﬁnal stock variaƟon of the hydro-electric
reservoirs in the total system cost is computed using 50 e/MWh in all scenarios. This allows making
the results less dependent on the variable stock value of hydro-electric reservoirs while preserving the
management strategy of the water in the simulaƟon. Note that the variable cost of the reservoir is zero
in pracƟce if considered in a long-term model. In this short-term model, it is necessary to include the
cost of releasingmorewater since it will not be available later, i.e. outside of the simulated Ɵme horizon.
A scenario releasing more water should therefore be seen as more costly than another.
The remote-controlled hydro-electric producƟon is imposed to provide 150MWof upward reserve, 120


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: DistribuƟon of the capacity between the actors of the studied case in MW.




CCGT B 200 200
OCGT 360
Coal 300




ConsumpƟon [-3840, -2138] [-768, -428] [-512, -285]
Run-of-the-river [114.2, 287.2] [28.6, 71.8]
CogeneraƟon 62.6 11.4
ited ﬂexible capacity around its steady-state operaƟon point. See reference [34] for a discussion on the
technical ﬂexibility of modern nuclear power plants. In this base case, nuclear A provides up to 11.5% of
its maximum power, corresponding to 150MW, for downard reserve without any constraints. In the fol-
lowing, this ﬂexibility is referred to as ﬂexible nuclear to diﬀerenƟate if from a shiŌ of operaƟonal point.
The capaciƟes of Table 5 lead to a system of 9 thermal producƟon units for a total of 14 controllable
producƟon units.
Table 5: Parameters of the thermal units.
Type
Variable Startup Power Ramp On Oﬀ Steady NoƟce
cost cost range rate Ɵme Ɵme period delay
e/MWh ke MW MW/h h h min min
Nuclear A 10 325 [250, 1300] 2400 72 24 120 30
Nuclear B 12 225 [180, 860] 1800 72 24 120 30
CCGT A 28 21.5 [180, 400] 1020 4 4 15 15
CCGT B 30 10 [100, 200] 1020 4 4 15 15
OCGT 150 7.2 [125, 180] 720 0.5 15
Coal 20 30 [150, 300] 210 8 8 60 45
Table 6: Outage parameters of the thermal units.
Unit Yearly occurrence DuraƟon DeraƟng
% h %
Nuclear B 5 7 25
CCGT A 5 3 50
CCGT B 5 3 100
Coal 7.5 7 50
The Ɵme series used to model the consumpƟon and producƟon from run-of-the-river hydroelectricity,
cogeneraƟon, photovoltaic and wind are taken from historical chronicles of France in 2014 scaled to
1/20. The numbers given in Table 4 are the range of values taken by the Ɵme series and the installed
capaciƟes for the photovoltaic and wind producƟons. Forecasts for each of these Ɵme series are gener-
ated as explained in SecƟon 3.1. Figure 6 shows the individual error of each actor at the clearing of the
day-ahead market, one hour ahead and 15 minutes ahead. These forecasts lead to a system forecast
errors on the day-ahead of 3.06% with a maximum of 11.84%, and 1.18% in real-Ɵme with a maximum
26
of 6.03%. This forecast error is indirectly observed by the system operator via its imbalance forecast












D-1 T-60' T-15' D-1 T-60' T-15' D-1 T-60' T-15' D-1 T-60' T-15' D-1 T-60' T-15'
System Actor 1 Actor 2 Actor 3 Actor 4
Average 95 percentile
Figure 6: RelaƟve forecast errors.
The system is simulated over 32 consecuƟve days represenƟng January. Each day is divided into 96 sim-
ulaƟon Ɵme steps. The day-ahead market divides the next day into 24 market periods. The intraday
market resoluƟon is set to 15 minutes. The system operator is reacƟve, i.e. only acƟvates balancing in
the current 15 minutes simulaƟon Ɵme step. There is no short-term reserve mechanism. The neutral-
izaƟon delay is set to 15 minutes. The imbalance prices are computed according to the average single
price imbalance seƩlement mechanism described in SecƟon 4.4 and the parameters given in Table 2.
For conciseness, results only provide one imbalance price measure which corresponds to the average
of the posiƟve and negaƟve imbalance prices.
5.2. Results from the simulaƟon of the base case
Results are obtained aŌer 15 hours of computaƟon. The energy shares of each producƟon technology
and the corresponding average producƟon costs are given in Table 7. The variable costs provided in this
table include startup costs. For most types of producƟon unit, these costs are close to their variable
costs. OCGT units make the excepƟon with predominant startup costs since they are mostly used in
brief producƟon peaks. Figure 7 shows the top part of the realizaƟon of the producƟon since 78% of the
produced energy is provided by nuclear plants. Nuclear plants are mostly producing at their maximum
capacity but sƟll reduce their producƟon by 15% to 30% during the night and at the week-end.
Table 7: Breakdown by producƟon technology of the energy share and short-term producƟon costs.






















Nuclear CCGT Coal Hydro Renewable OCGT
Figure 7: Zoom on the realizaƟon throughout the simulated month of the producƟon divided per tech-
nology.
Themedian of volumes exchanged per hour in the day-aheadmarket is 570MWhwith a standard devia-
Ɵon of 149 MWh. This corresponds to 15% of the average producƟon. This rate is low since most of the
consumpƟon belongs to the porƞolio of power companies owning producƟon assets. This rate is of the
same order of magnitude as the 21% reached in 2016 by France on EPEX which includes exports [16].
The median day-ahead market price is 26.59 e/MWh with a standard deviaƟon of 11.48 e/MWh. The
median of intraday exchanges per hour is 136MWh, 3.5% of the average producƟon, with a standard de-
viaƟon of 83 MWh. The standard deviaƟon magnitude shows the high volaƟlity of this intraday market
which is conﬁrmed by the median price of 28.69 e/MWh with a standard deviaƟon of 20.72 e/MWh.
The median imbalance price is 41.06 e/MWh with a standard deviaƟon of 28.74 e/MWh. The 8% dif-
ference between the upward and downward prices comes from the coeﬃcient k as detailed in Table 2.
Over the month, there are ten balancing periods where the imbalance price reaches 400 e/MWh. This
value corresponds to themarginal cost of running an OCGT for a single quarter which ranges from 385 to
550 e/MWh taking into account the startup costs. Balancing is mainly provided by the ﬂexible nuclear
producƟon and the remote-controlled hydro-electric reservoirs. OCGTs aremostly used in thismodel for
downward balancing in the simulated scenarios. A typical scenario is when actor 1 dispatches an OCGT
plant to balance itself and that the system requires less producƟon than anƟcipated. As a result, the
system operator requires downward balancing from the OCGT. Curtailment of renewable energy only
happens in four 15’ Ɵme steps for downward balancing of approximately 20MW from wind turbines
during the night. The model allows the system operator to perform economic counter-acƟvaƟons i.e.
acƟvate two bids that cancel each other out if the downward cost is higher than the upward cost, see
SecƟon 4.3. These counter-acƟvaƟons sum up to 12% of the balancing energy. They mainly take the
form of an energy transfer between the reservoirs of actors 1 and 2 when their stock values diﬀer. The
balancing acƟvaƟon could be modeled to be less sensiƟve to economic counter-acƟvaƟons by changing
the acƟvaƟon costs.
Figure 8 shows how exchanges in the day-ahead and intraday markets impact the net posiƟon of the
power companies. Actor 1 is the main seller in the day-ahead market since it owns the cheapest pro-
ducƟon units. Most of the Ɵme, actor 2 is a buyer on the day-ahead market. Actor 3 is a pure retailer
which buys the totality of its energy on the day-aheadmarket. Actor 4, possessing the renewable energy
producƟon, only sells on the day-ahead market. Actors 3 and 4 sƟll exchange small quanƟƟes on the
intraday market which correspond to their forecast updates. In intraday, Actor 1 buys energy from actor
2 which possesses the CCGTs with a cheaper ﬂexibility than the hydro-electric reservoirs. The median
stock value obtained over themonth is 43.22e/MWhwith a standard deviaƟon of 8.15e/MWh. Energy
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provided for balancing represents 30% of the hydro-electric reservoirs producƟon.















Figure 8: Box plot of the net exchanges in the day-ahead market (DAM) and intraday market (IM) where
posiƟve quanƟƟes represents energy to be produced by the power company.
The day-ahead and intradaymarkets, aswell as the balancingmechanism, allows for using block bids and
links between blocks. In the development of the model, those blocks imposed themselves as necessary
to properly communicate the constraints of thermal units. In the day-aheadmarket, 27 of the submiƩed
bids where blocks or linked bids corresponding to 6.3% of the total number of bids and 10% of the
volume. In intraday, there are 115 linked bids per day acceptedwith 35 pure blocks. They only represent
6.3% of the total number of bids but sum up to 32% of the energy exchanged. The balancing capacity
counts 369 linked bids per day on average, which represents 23% of the communicated capacity. On
average, only 4% of the acƟvated balancing energy corresponds to linked bids. There are ﬁve days over
the simulated month where the energy covered by the linked oﬀers reaches more than 10% of the total
energy acƟvated.
5.3. SimulaƟon bias
To obtain results in a reasonable amount of Ɵme but sƟll be robust with respect to diﬃcult opƟmiza-
Ɵon problems, the mixed-integer linear programs are solved with a tolerance of 5% and a Ɵme limit of
600 seconds. This introduces some randomness in the results which must be quanƟﬁed. The sources
of this randomness are the heurisƟcs used by the solver, the parallelizaƟon of the branch-and-bound
algorithm, etc. The instance of SecƟon 5.2 is simulated twenty Ɵmes. The aim is to determine the mini-
mum variaƟon of an indicator to be signiﬁcant with respect to the simulaƟon bias. Table 8 provides the
diﬀerence between the maximum and the minimum values observed divided by the average value of
the medians and standard deviaƟons of diﬀerent Ɵme series of instance simulated several Ɵmes. Note
that these biases are very pessimisƟc since they are based on the worst recorded diﬀerence.
The running Ɵme ranges from 14 to 17 hours to simulate the same month under the same condiƟons.
The average producƟon cost ranges from 13.95 to 14.16 e/MWh with an average of 14.04 e/MWh,
which leads to a maximum bias of 1.5%. The average daily total revenues of actor 1 have a similar
maximum variaƟon of 1.56%. Themedian day-ahead price is idenƟcal in each of the twenty simulaƟons.
The median is less aﬀected by outliers and is therefore used for the analysis of the results. The average
day-aheadmarket price has a bias of 5% or 1.29e/MWh. Themedians of day-ahead and intraday prices
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Table 8: Maximum bias of the medians and standard deviaƟons of Ɵme series for the same instance
simulated twenty Ɵmes.
Accuracies Median Std. deviaƟon Unit
Day-ahead price 0 2.54 e/MWh
Day-ahead volume 31 15.9 MWh
Intraday price 0.93 5.25 e/MWh
Intraday volume 28.55 22.16 MWh
Imbalance price 12.33 5.33 e/MWh
Imbalance 1.04 1.86 MW
Reservoirs stock value 10.55 1.18 e/MWh
and volumes are very reliablewith a less than 5%error. Themedian imbalance pricesmay change by 20%
which is the consequence of very volaƟle reservoir stock values, by approximately the same amount.
The maximum diﬀerence of energy producƟon from the reservoirs is 8.8% explaining the diﬀerence
of reservoir stock values. This diﬀerence comforts the choice of seƫng the economic impact of the
ﬁnal stock variaƟon at a constant value and not at the computed variable stock values. Stock values
are not taken constant in the simulaƟon since the computed value impact the strategy of the actors.
For instance, if balancing volumes decrease then the producƟon from reservoirs also decreases and
stock values need to decrease in order to be able to sell the addiƟonal reservoirs stock supply in energy
markets.
5.4. Steady-state constraints and delays of noƟce
In this scenario, steady-state constraints are ignored as well as delays of noƟce. The two constraints
are grouped together since they are oŌen ignored in the literature. This secƟon shows why they are
compulsory to correctly model balancing and how they impact the total cost.
Ignoring these two constraints reduce the computaƟonƟmeby 30% to 10 hours. The average producƟon
cost decreases by 2.7% to 13.65 e/MWh. This decrease is the result of a 3.42% decrease of the pro-
ducƟon costs from CCGTs, 0.78% from hydro-electric reservoirs and 0.48% from coal units compensated
by an increase of 1.42% in nuclear producƟon costs. The median day-ahead market price decreases by
5.64% to 25.09 e/MWh. The median intraday price also decreases by 7.2% to 26.62 e/MWh.
The volumes of imbalance barely change between the base case and the one using the relaxed thermal
model since the main causes of imbalances are forecast errors and outages of thermal units. The tech-
nologies used for balancing are given in Figure 9. NeglecƟng the noƟﬁcaƟon delays and the steady-state
constraints allows CCGT to provide 30% of the balancing energy. Standard nuclear producƟon is able to
provide 15%of the upward balancing energy. The contribuƟon of upward balancing of the hydro-electric
reservoirs reduces to 45%. The contribuƟon to downward balancing of reservoirs is less aﬀected by the
relaxaƟon of themodel. This results in a diminuƟon of the energy producƟon from the reservoirs of 11%
leading to a median hydro-electric stock value of 30.50e/MWh i.e. 30% less than in the base case. This
price allows one to sell the hydro-electric stock supply in the day-ahead energy market in compeƟƟon
with CCGTs. 22% of the balancing energy comes from economic counter-acƟvaƟons, which explains the
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Figure 9: Share of each technology in the upward and downward balancing acƟvaƟons in the base case
and with a relaxed thermal model neglecƟng steady-state constraints and delay of noƟce.
5.5. Time and porƞolio resoluƟon of the day-ahead market
This secƟon evaluates the impact of two parameters: the resoluƟon of the day-ahead market and the
strategy used by actor 1 to build its oﬀers. In the base case, the day-ahead market clears 24 market
periods and actor 1 provides porƞolio-based oﬀers.
In the ﬁrst scenario, the resoluƟon of the day-aheadmarket is set to 15minutes and actor 1 sƟll provides
porƞolio-based oﬀers. The simulaƟon results show no diﬀerence of the median volume exchanged in
the day-aheadmarket or the prices with respect to the base case. The same assessment for the intraday
market shows that the diﬀerence in resoluƟon is not the main cause of the intraday exchanges in this
model. There is no impact on the imbalance volumes or prices since the outcomes of the energymarkets
are idenƟcal.
The strategy used by the power companies to build market oﬀers is idenƟcal to the base case of SecƟon
5.2. In parƟcular, actor 1 provides porƞolio-based oﬀers as described in SecƟon 3.5, i.e. single market
period oﬀers which can be parƟally accepted. One could wonder what the result of a simulaƟon with
unit-based day-ahead market oﬀers from actor 1 might be. The porƞolio-based strategy is used in the
base case by actor 1 since it has a large and ﬂexible porƞolio of unitswhich allows for reducing the impact
of dynamic constraints on its schedule. This soluƟon is opƟmisƟc compared to the possibility granted
by the dynamic constraints of the producƟon units. On the other hand, the unit-based strategy detailed
in SecƟon 3.4 is pessimisƟc since it does not include combinaƟons of units. The inﬂuence of a porƞolio-
based or unit-based strategy used by actor 1 to compute oﬀers for the day-ahead market is given in
Figure 10. The total energy exchanged in the intraday market decreases by 20% in the unit-based case.
The revenues from the day-ahead market of actor 1 increases with the porƞolio-based strategy. This
increase is equally compensated by the revenues from the intraday market. Day-ahead market prices
resulƟng from the unit-based strategy are more volaƟle with the same median but a standard deviaƟon
of 186.9 e/MWh instead of 11.48 e/MWh in the base case. This high standard deviaƟon is the result
of various negaƟve prices and price peaks above 150 e/MWh. This is the consequence of the large
number of blocks that results from the unit-based strategy. Our simulaƟon leads to four-Ɵmes more
linked bids on average than with the porƞolio-based strategy. Note that the number of blocks is limited
in the current day-ahead market as well as the number of links between the blocks [19]. The unit-based
soluƟon is less realisƟc to be used in pracƟce in the day-ahead market for this reason and moƟvates the
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Figure 10: Box plot of the intraday exchanges of actor 1 using the unit-based or the porƞolio-based
strategy in a day-ahead market (DAM) of 24 or 96 periods.
5.6. Short-term balancing reserve procurement
Instead of imposing the unit-based reserve procurement in the long-term, this scenario uses the short-
term reservemechanism described in SecƟon 4.1. The reserve procurement occurs at 17:00 for the next
day. With the given parameters, only reservoirs, the ﬂexible nuclear producƟon and OCGTs are eligible
as reserve capacity. Renewable producƟon is arbitrarily prevented due to the high uncertainty that may
result from its forecast. Reserve requirements are symmetric and given by the maximum between 4%
of the consumpƟon and 10% of the renewable producƟon for a median requirement of 159 MWwith a
standard deviaƟon of 19.5 MW.
This reserve is provided by the porƞolios of actors 1 and 2. Actor 1 provides 72% of the upward reserve
and 93% of the downward one. The resulƟng reserve prices are given in Figure 11. The average upward
price is 6.09 e/MW/h. The upward reserve price is at its minimum, 1 e/MW/h, 92% of the Ɵme. The
average price over the remaining hours is 67.29 e/MW/h. There are a few hours where the price goes
above 100e/MW/h and even onewhere the price reaches 350e/MW/h driven by the startup of OCGTs.
The rest of the Ɵme, OCGTs are already idle and are therefore able to provide reserves without the need
to modify the original schedule. The average downward reserve price over the month is 12.58e/MW/h
which is higher than the upward one. This means that the producƟon units able to provide reserves are
not producing in the iniƟal schedule. Usually the hydro-electric reservoirs are not producing in the iniƟal
schedule. One method to provide reserve is to decrease the nuclear or CCGTs producƟon and replace it
by hydro-electric producƟon. Downward reserve prices are diﬀerent from theminimum price in 56.51%
of the hours with an average of 21.49 e/MW/h, which corresponds to the average cost of performing
this switch.
Results show that the average producƟon cost is not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the short-term reserve
mechanism compared to the base case where the ﬂexible nuclear producƟon and a part of the hydro-
electric reservoirs provide constant reserves. There is no signiﬁcant change in the prices and exchanges
from the day-ahead energy market. The median intraday price decreases from 28.69 e/MWh to 28.02
e/MWh even if this variaƟon is of the order of magnitude of the simulaƟon bias. The imbalance signal,
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Figure 11: Hourly short-term reserve prices.
system, the results of using the long-term or the short-term reserve mechanism does not signiﬁcantly
impact the ﬁnal producƟon schedule. However, the approach quanƟﬁes the reservaƟon cost at a reso-
luƟon of one hour which could be used to calibrate a long-term reservaƟon price.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper details the implementaƟon of SiSTEM, a model for the SimulaƟon of Short-Term Electricity
Markets. This model embeds an end-to-end representaƟon of short-term electricity markets in a single
market zone from exchanges that occur the day before real-Ɵme to balancing acƟvaƟons and imbalance
seƩlement, providing the mathemaƟcal problems inﬂuencing the decisions of all actors. Power com-
panies interact with the day-ahead electricity market, the intraday market and the system operator.
The laƩer procures short-term reserve, acƟvates balancing capaciƟes and deﬁnes the imbalance prices.
This model aims at accurately represenƟng short-term electricity markets, with special aƩenƟon paid to
balancing mechanisms and the producƟon assets constraints inﬂuencing their outcomes. Each power
company, with its speciﬁc porƞolio, performs complex unit commitments at a 15-minute granularity.
The assets handled by the model are thermal units, hydro-electric reservoirs and curtailable renewable
producƟon. The thermal unit model integrates tradiƟonal unit-commitment constraints, start-up/shut
down phases, and minimum on and oﬀ Ɵmes. The model is enhanced by taking into account noƟﬁca-
Ɵon delays inherent tomany thermal units and steady-state constraints. InteracƟonswith the day-ahead
market, the intraday market and the system operator are conducted via bids which may be mulƟ-period
with parƟal acceptance or not, and may be linked between them. The oﬀers-building strategy of power
companies can either be porƞolio-based or unit-based. To the best of our knowledge, no arƟcles in
the literature which provide an eﬃcient and accurate strategy to create ﬂexibility oﬀers from a sched-
ule of a porƞolio of units using diﬀerent market products such as block bids and links between blocks.
This paper details two strategies of power companies to build block oﬀers for the energy markets or to
communicate their balancing capaciƟes.
The objecƟve of developing this model is to understand the consequences of decisions made by com-
peƟƟve actors in the short-term, to provide insights on how these problems can be solved, and to see
how the decisions are linked together in order to shape a consistent power system. Running this model
allows for conclusions to be validated on study cases, taking into account the underlying hypotheses,
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as is the case with all simulaƟon models. Results presented in this paper only aim at illustraƟng the
capabiliƟes of the model and are obtained from the simulaƟon of a ﬁcƟve instance. Conclusions could
be diﬀerent in other scenarios, for instance with an increased share of renewable energy, less nuclear
producƟon capacity, or diﬀerent parameters for the ﬂexibility of thermal units.
Compared to single ﬁrm opƟmizaƟon models, mulƟ-actor simulaƟon models and in parƟcular SiSTEM,
allows for analyzing prices, exchanges between the actors and their strategies. In parƟcular, the model
provides insighƞul intraday price approximaƟons, shows how the exchanges depend on the porƞolio of
the actors, and allows for assessing diﬀerent strategies of balancing, market oﬀer construcƟon, etc. For
instance, traders could be implemented in this model and their impact quanƟtaƟvely assessed.
Another parƟcularity of SiSTEM is to model the system at a sub-hourly resoluƟon. A comparison with
an hourly resoluƟon shows the importance of detailed thermal constraints on intraday exchanges and
balancing acƟvaƟons. Among these constraints, the delay of noƟce before making changes and the
minimum Ɵme in steady-state operaƟon have a signiﬁcant impact on the results. These constraints also
impact the oﬀers proposed in the diﬀerent markets. In the simulated scenario, 32% of the volumes
being exchanged intraday are block oﬀers or oﬀers linked to blocks. 23% of the available balancing ca-
pacity also corresponds to block or linked oﬀers. The majority of the volumes exchanged in intraday
aims at reducing the gap between the soluƟons obtained from previous market clearings including, in
parƟcular, the day-ahead market one, towards the economic opƟmum. Bids, with a reasonable number
of blocks and links, cannot perfectly reﬂect the complex constraints of a producƟon unit porƞolio. How-
ever, successive exchanges in intraday achieve a state of the system as close to the opƟmum as would
a benevolent planner. Therefore, the modeled markets allow power companies to accurately translate
their energy needs and their technical constraints into oﬀers. There is no need to add more short-term
market products in the simulaƟon model, e.g. linear piecewise oﬀers, minimum income oﬀers of the
day-ahead market in Spain, etc.
Balancing acƟons in the studied system are signiﬁcantly impacted by the model and hypotheses of the
management of hydro-electric reservoirs. In parƟcular, the stock values of the reservoirs drive the im-
balance prices. The strategy used in pracƟce by power companies to deﬁne their water stock values is
within industrial experƟse and requires the simultaneous handling of environmental and technical con-
straints both in short term and long term. This model provides one method to model its economic use.
Comparing the alternaƟve hydro-electric reservoirs models would be worth invesƟgaƟng.
Before inferring a conclusion onmarket design by comparing simulaƟon results, every simulaƟonmodel
should quanƟfy the inﬂuence of the simulaƟon bias on the results. A small variaƟon in outputs could be
the result of a change in market design or a diﬀerence inherent to the non-determinisƟc results of some
algorithms. This bias sƟll exists in pracƟce with unit commitments not solved to opƟmality, human
decisions that are not always raƟonal, etc. It is parƟcularly important to be able to draw conclusions
on balancing since the concerned energy is marginal with respect to the total producƟon. Performing
the same simulaƟon several Ɵmes allows one to observe more consistent changes in the results. It is
parƟcularly important in an electrical system where a variaƟon of the producƟon cost by one percent
represents millions of euros per year.
The next perspecƟve for the model is therefore to perform staƟsƟcal analyses and draw conclusions on
the length of the neutralizaƟon delay, the imbalance seƩlement period, or the length of the system op-
erator’s operaƟonal window. The model could also be used to compare the market design on diﬀerent
countrymixes or observe the inﬂuence of the harmonizaƟon of the balancingmechanism in Europe. The
model can be extended to study the impact on the electrical system of power companies with diﬀerent
behaviors. One could even try to add an actor that would act randomly or negaƟvely in order to per-
form a stress test on a market design. SiSTEM could also be used to benchmark diﬀerent market oﬀer
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strategies of power companies. The model could be extended to handle exchanges between diﬀerent
market zones, in parƟcular the exchange of balancing services between various system operators.
7. APPENDIX A: UNIT MODELS
In the units-scheduling problem (3) of SecƟon 3.2, each producƟon unit i has its own set of technical
constraints Xi and a cost funcƟon Ci(pi). Technical constraints limit the output power pi and the up-
ward and downward balancing capacity, b+i and b i . In the model, three types of producƟon unit are
implemented: thermal units, hydro-electric reservoirs and curtailable producƟon. They respecƟvely are
the topics of SecƟons 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3. Due to the discreƟzaƟon of the Ɵme horizon, the power is consid-
ered constant in each Ɵme step and every parameter must be scaled according to the length of a Ɵme
step.
7.1. Thermal units model
The considered constraints of thermal units are: a minimum noƟce delay before changing the produc-
Ɵon plan, a minimum power deﬁning the producƟon phase, a minimum Ɵme in producƟon phase, the
start-up and shutdown ramping rates when the unit is below the minimum power, the upward and
downward ramping rates in producƟon phase, a minimum oﬀ-Ɵme aŌer a shutdown and a minimum
steady-state Ɵme in the producƟon phase. Model (8) describes the constraints and objecƟve funcƟon
of a thermal unit without steady-state Ɵme constraints. AddiƟonal constraints needed to model the
minimum steady-state Ɵme are given by model (10). Note that formulaƟon (8) may diﬀer slightly from
the literature in order to obtain a valid schedule on sub-hourly resoluƟons.
Parameters
i Variable cost
dsi Shutdown ramping rate 2 R 
[di; ui] Minimum and maximum ramping rate in producƟon phase
non; noﬀ Minimum up and down Ɵme steps




i;t ] ProducƟon range in producƟon phase
us Start up ramping rate 2 R+
Variables
pi;t Power output
vi;t Begin of a start-up phase
wi;t End of a shutdown phase
xi;t Start-up status
yi;t ProducƟon phase status
zi;t Shut-down status






(ipi;t + ivi;t) (8a)
with Xi =

xi;t + yi;t + zi;t  1 8t 2 T (8b)
xi;t  1  yi;t 1   zi;t 1 8t 2 T (8c)
yi;t  xi;t 1 + yi;t 1 8t 2 T (8d)
xi;t + yi;t  xi;t 1 8t 2 T (8e)
zi;t  yi;t 1 + zi;t 1 8t 2 T (8f)
vi;t   wi;t = xi;t + yi;t + zi;t   xi;t 1   yi;t 1   zi;t 1 8t 2 T (8g)
vi;t + wi;t  1 8t 2 T (8h)
pi;t  pmaxi;t yi;t + pmin(xi;t + zi;t) 8t 2 T (8i)
pmini;t yi;t  pi;t 8t 2 T (8j)
pi;t  di(zi;t + zi;t+1   1) 8t 2 T (8k)
pj;t = p
0
j;t 8t 2Mi (8l)
pi;t   pi;t 1  uiyi;t + usixi;t 8t 2 T (8m)
pi;t   pi;t 1  diyi;t + dsi zi;t 8t 2 T (8n)
pi;t   pi;t 1  diyi;t + dsi zi;t + usi (xi;t + xi;t 1   1) 8t 2 T (8o)
pi;t   pi;t 1  uiyi;t + usixi;t + dsi (zi;t + zi;t 1   1) 8t 2 T (8p)
non(yi;t   yi;t 1) 
t+non 1X
=t
yi;t 8t 2 T (8q)
1  wi;t  xi; + yi; 8t 2 T ;  2 ft; t+ noﬀ   2g (8r)
wherewi;t; xi;t; yi;t; zi;t 2 f0; 1g;8t 2 T
	
. Constraints (8b)-(8h) link the start-up, producƟon and shut-
down phase binary variables. The unit may only be in one of the modes at most (8b). A unit cannot be
started if it is in producƟon or shutdown phase in the previous Ɵme step (8c). The producƟon phase can
only be reached from a start-up phase or a producƟon phase (8d). From a start-up phase, the unit must
go to another start-up phase or in-producƟon phase (8e). A unit can be in shutdown phase if its status
in the previous Ɵme step is either producƟon or shutdown (8f). Equality (8g) deﬁnes the beginning of
startup phases and the end of shutdown phases. This constraint Ɵghtens the formulaƟon by express-
ing the state transiƟon as a ﬂow constrain [24]. The formulaƟon is further Ɵghtened by inequality (8h)
expressing that a unit cannot start and stop simultaneously [31].
Based on the three statuses of the unit: start-up, producƟon or shutdown, the dynamic constraints of
the unit are given by (8i)-(9f). The maximum producƟon of the unit is constrained by (8i). If the unit
is producing, its minimum power is deﬁned by (8j). In the shutdown phase, the producƟon can only
be zero in the last shutdown Ɵme step (8k). The schedule of the unit is ﬁxed on Ɵme steps no further
than the noƟce delay (8l). Ramping constraints are handled by (8m)-(8n). The rampings in the start-up
and shutdown phases are forced to equal the value given as a parameter by constraints (8o)-(8p). Note
that these constraints are only acƟve if the starƟng or shutdown phase lasts more than one Ɵme step
to handle the starƟng of a unit in the middle of a Ɵme step. A started unit must be on for a minimum
amount of Ɵme steps as enforced by (8q). A unit which is oﬀmust stay oﬀ for at least aminimumamount
of Ɵme steps (8r).
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If the thermal unit is eligible to provide reserves, the following addiƟonal constraints are added to the
model of the unit, or else the reserve capacity of the unit is set to zero. A thermal unit is eligible if its
steady-state period and its noƟce delay are less than or equal to a balancing period. Note that even if the
unit is not set as eligible, balancing capacity can sƟll be obtained by compuƟng the available ﬂexibility












i;t  pmaxi;t   pi;t 8t 2 T (9a)
b i;t + r
 
i;t  ytpmini;t   pi;t 8t 2 T (9b)
b+i;t + r
+
i;t  yi;t(pmaxi;t   pmini;t ) 8t 2 T (9c)
b i;t + r
 
i;t  yt(pmini;t   pmaxi;t ) 8t 2 T (9d)
b+i;t + r
+
i;t + pi;t   pi;t 1  ui 8t 2 T (9e)
b i;t + r
 
i;t + pi;t   pi;t 1  di 8t 2 T (9f)
The reserve that must be provided by the unit is enforced by (9a)-(9f). These constraints also compute
the available amount of balancing capacity from the unit. EquaƟons (9a)-(9b) ensure that the neces-
sary power margin is kept. Balancing and reserve cannot be provided if the unit is not on, following
constraints (9c)-(9d). InequaliƟes (9e) - (9f) imposes the ramping constraint on the balancing capacity.
Some thermal producƟon units need to include a minimum amount of Ɵme in their model during which
the power is constant, to stabilize its operaƟon. This is not usually included in tradiƟonal unit commit-
ment formulaƟons since they are usually done on an hourly Ɵme step. If producƟon units switch from
ramping up to ramping down without this period of steady operaƟon, it increases the risk of equipment
damage [44]. It is mandatory for higher resoluƟon unit commitment to model a steady-state period. Al-
though nuclear power plants control systems enable a fast plant response, there are several constraints
that prevent the plant from regularly operaƟng that way such as fuel integrity problems and xenon oscil-
laƟons [23]. Cycling aﬀects the lifespan of heat recovery steam generators, which are part of combined
cycle plants [33]. Disregarding faƟgue of combined-cycle gas turbine power plants leads to average op-
eraƟng costs that are higher than those resulƟng from taking faƟgue into account [43]. In this model,
minimum steady-state periods are imposed by extending the opƟmizaƟonmodel (8) with the constraints
given in (10).
AddiƟonal parameters
nb Minimum number of steady-state Ɵme steps
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AddiƟonal variables
yai;t Upward ramping producƟon phase status
ybi;t Steady-state producƟon phase status






i;t = yi;t 8t 2 T (10a)
yai;t + y
b
i;t  yai;t 1 8t 2 T (10b)
ybi;t + y
c
i;t + zi;t  yci;t 1 8t 2 T (10c)
yai;t  1  (yci;t 1 + zi;t 1) 8t 2 T (10d)
yci;t  1  (yai;t 1 + xi;t 1) 8t 2 T (10e)
xt 1  xi;t + yai;t + ybi;t 8t 2 T (10f)
yat  xt 1 + yat 1 + ybt 1 8t 2 T (10g)
yct  ybt 1 + yct 1 8t 2 T (10h)
di(1  ybi;t)  pi;t   pi;t 1  ui(1  ybi;t) 8t 2 T (10i)
di(1  yai;t)  pi;t   pi;t 1  ui(1  yci;t) 8t 2 T (10j)
pi;t   pi;t 1  uai (yai;t + yai;t 1 + xi;t 1   1) + di(yci;t + zi;t) 8t 2 T (10k)
pi;t   pi;t 1  ui(xi;t + yai;t) + dci (yci;t + yci;t 1   1) 8t 2 T (10l)
pi;t   pi;t 1  ui(xi;t + yai;t) + dci (zi;t + yci;t 1   1) 8t 2 T (10m)
pi;t   pi;t 1  ui(xi;t + yai;t) + dci (yci;t + yci;t+1 + zi;t+1   1) 8t 2 T (10n)
nb(ybi;t   ybi;t 1) 
t+nb 1X
=t
ybi;t 8t 2 T (10o)
with yai;t; ybi;t; yci;t 2 f0; 1g;8t 2 T . Constraints (10a)-(10e) deﬁnes the variables of the producƟon
phase status. They are Ɵghtened by inequaliƟes (10f)-(10h). Ramping constraints in the producƟon
phase are enforced by (10i)-(10j). AddiƟonal ramping constraints (10k)-(10n) ensures the conƟnuity of
the ramping, i.e. ramping at the maximum ramping rate if the unit is ramping in two consecuƟve Ɵme
steps. Finally, the minimum steady-state Ɵme is enforced by (10o).
To simplify the descripƟon, models (8)-(10) ignore cases where constraints refer to Ɵme steps outside of
the opƟmizaƟon horizon T . If a schedule is already deﬁned, constraints for the Ɵme steps immediately
before and aŌer the opƟmizaƟon horizon are saƟsﬁed by increasing the horizon by two Ɵme steps and
ﬁxing the corresponding powers to the given realizaƟons. Cases regarding more than two Ɵme steps
in the future are handled by adding constraints and ﬁxings ensuring the consistency of the soluƟon
outside of the opƟmizaƟon horizon. For instance, consider a unit which has been switched oﬀ at 3:00, a
minimum oﬀ Ɵme of two hours, and an hourly opƟmizaƟon horizon from 4:00 to 6:00. A pre-processing
must prevent the unit from being be switched on unƟl 5:00. Another example is a unit that is switched
oﬀ unƟl 14:00, aminimumoﬀƟmeof two hours and an opƟmizaƟon horizon from11:00 to 13:00. Due to
the scheduled start, the unit cannot be switched on in this opƟmizaƟon horizon and saƟsfy theminimum
oﬀ Ɵme aŌerwards. Similar consideraƟons need to be taken into account for the minimum on and the
steady-state Ɵmes.
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Upward unit-based ﬂexibility is obtained by solving the opƟmizaƟon problem (5) and proposing, as of-
fers, the diﬀerence between the current schedule and a maximum producƟon schedule. This ﬂexibility
needs to be converted into standard bids as shown in Figure 12a. Upward oﬀers are separated into two
parts: base block bids and operaƟon bids. Figure 12a illustrates the process of building upward ﬂexibil-
ity oﬀers for units without steady-state constraint. The ﬂexibility on market periods 1   12 is split into
block bids 1   3 and operaƟon bids 4   11. Base block bids oﬀer the ﬂexibility of the unit below its
minimal power. The cost of these bids includes the unit variable costs and the start-up costs. Start-up
costs are considered depending on the schedule. A basic example is the case where the unit is started
only to provide ﬂexibility. However, it is not always as straighƞorward to include the start-up cost. For
instance, bid 1 does not include any start-up cost since the unit would be already started anyway in mar-
ket period 3. Another example is given by bid 2, in which the start-up cost needs to be subtracted since
one start-up is avoided if the bid is accepted. OperaƟon bids cover the ﬂexibility above the minimal
power and are oﬀered at the unit variable cost. They are dependent on the base bids. Bid 4 can only
be accepted if bid 1 is accepted. Bids 6 to 9 can only be accepted if bid 2 is accepted. Bid 5 and 10 are
independent. If the thermal unit has a minimum steady-state Ɵme greater than a market period, bids
4   12 are merged into a single oﬀer. In the laƩer case, this single operaƟon can be parƟally accepted
only if bids 1   3 are accepted. The principle for building downward ﬂexibility is similar and illustrated
in Figure 12b. The downward ﬂexibility is separated into two parts: the operaƟon bids above minimum
power, and the base block bids. Base bids may only be accepted totally and include the start-up costs if
they are relevant. For the downward ﬂexibility, no links are integrated between base bids and operaƟon
bids. In the example of Figure 12b, bid 1 may in theory be accepted and bid 6 rejected. This situaƟon
is unlikely to happen in pracƟce since bid 1 is more expensive due to the start-up cost and more diﬃ-
cult to use since it is a block covering mulƟple periods. Future work could add an exclusive relaƟonship
between the base bids and a new block bid, including the base bids and the operaƟon bids. For units
with steady-state constraints, operaƟon bids are oﬀered as a single oﬀer. If its length is greater than the
steady-state Ɵme, the resulƟng mulƟ-period oﬀer may-be parƟally accepted, otherwise a binary bid is
oﬀered. In the example of Figure 12a, areas 4 to 11 are merged in a single bid with parƟal acceptance.
OperaƟon blocks of duraƟon inferior to the steady-state period are alsomergedwith base blocks if there
is any block covering one of the Ɵme steps of the operaƟon block.
7.2. Hydro-electric reservoirs model
In pracƟce, the management of hydro-electric reservoirs is very complex and diﬀers from one reservoir
to another. ExploitaƟon of the water in one place must conform to a dedicated contract, including many
constraints diﬃcult to formulate: dynamic producƟon constraints, ﬁshing constraints, seasonality con-
straints, etc. On the Ɵme scale of the study, the complexity behind these dynamics may be summarized
by simple dynamic bounds on the storage level and the power output of the reservoir. A porƞolio of
hydro-electric reservoirs Uh is scheduled at once using model (11) incorporaƟng a coupling constraint
between the diﬀerent reservoirs in the global porƞolio model X h.
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(b) Downward ﬂexibility
Figure 12: Building of ﬂexibility oﬀers of a thermal unit.
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t  Smaxt +Dmaxj;t 8t 2 T (11g)
pj;t = p
0
j;t 8(j; t) 2 Uh Mj (11h)
where sj;t 2 [sminj;t ; smaxj;t ]; pj;t 2 [pminj;t ; pmaxj;t ] 8(j; t) 2 Uh  T ; (dminj;t ; dmaxj;t ) 2 R   R+ 8(j; t) 2
Uh  T ; (Dmini;t ; Dmaxi;t ) 2 R   R+ 8t 2 T g. The cost of spilling water expressed in (11a) is given by
the diﬀerence of stock level mulƟplied by the stock value. EvoluƟon of the stock from one Ɵme step
to another is given by equality (11a). Power bounds, integraƟng the ﬂexibility, are given by inequaliƟes
(11b)-(11c). The eﬀect of the worst-case use of ﬂexibility on the stock is deﬁned by (11d)-(11e). Stock
bounds are implemented as soŌ constraints. The cost funcƟon (11a) penalizes the violaƟon of stock
bounds. In pracƟce, these stock bounds are given to saƟsfy long-term constraints of the stock and can
therefore allow slight violaƟons. The bounds on the total stock constraint are enforced by (11f)-(11g),
including the available ﬂexibility. Finally, constraint (11h) ﬁxes the schedule of a reservoir in Ɵme steps
in which it cannot be modiﬁed.
Note that in model (11), the stock value is assumed to be constant. The model could be reﬁned by con-
sidering the dependence of the stock value to the stock level. However, this would lead to a nonlinear,
yet convex opƟmizaƟon problem which would therefore be less tractable. Since our opƟmizaƟon hori-
zon is at most a few days, the approximaƟon is reasonable and does not jusƟfy the major overhead in
computaƟon Ɵme. The stock values are updated in each simulaƟon Ɵme step as a funcƟon of the stock
level at the last neutralized simulaƟon Ɵme step. The stock value for one Ɵme step is given by an aﬃne
funcƟon between two given stock values associated with the individual stock bounds. The default pa-
rameters are arbitrarily set to 20 and 120e/MWh, leading to a stock value of 70e/MWh at the middle
of the stock range. For the assessment of overall generaƟon costs, the ﬁnal stock is valued at a ﬁxed
stock value of 50 e/MWh.
7.3. Curtailable producƟon model
This model corresponds to the uncertain energy generaƟon producing by default but that may be cur-
tailed at a given cost, i.e. solar or wind producƟon units. By default, this cost is null. One could take neg-
aƟve costs to take into account subsidies depending on the speciﬁciƟes of the related support scheme.
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The model of a curtailable unit i is given by (12) and relies on a forecast of the available producƟon of
the unit. The details of the forecast mechanism are given in SecƟon 3.1.
Parameters
i Variable cost
pmaxi;t Forecast of available producƟon
r+i;t; r
 











with X h = f
  b i;t  pi;t  pmaxi;t   b+i;t 8t 2 T (12b)
where pi;t 2 [0; pmaxi;t ] 8t 2 T g. In this model, curtailable producƟon is not allowed to provide reserves
but may be used as a means of balancing. Flexibility of the producƟon unit is oﬀered as described in
SecƟon 3.3 except for balancing oﬀers. The capacity of balancing oﬀers is slightly reduced to account for
uncertainty. The default reducƟon is to propose, at most, 90% of the predicted producƟon and to keep
at least 1 MW of capacity.
8. APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL RESULTS
This appendix presents the results of six addiƟonal simulaƟon cases. See Table 3 for the descripƟon of
each case. The results of SecƟons 8.1 and 8.2 show that using a benevolent monopolisƟc representaƟon
of the system or an hourly resoluƟon requires signiﬁcantly less computaƟon Ɵme but sƟll leads to rel-
aƟvely accurate energy mixes and average producƟon costs. SecƟon 8.3 assumes perfect forecasts and
show that forecast errors explains signiﬁcant volumes of intraday exchanges and balancing acƟvaƟons.
SecƟon 8.4 shows how removing the intraday market impacts the use of the diﬀerent technologies.
SecƟon 8.5 highlights that it is diﬃcult for a power company to forecast how the system imbalance will
evolve within the next few hours. SecƟon 8.6 illustrates how a proacƟve system operator can help the
system by acƟvaƟng less ﬂexible units, depending on its ability to anƟcipate system imbalances.
8.1. Hourly resoluƟon of the simulaƟon
The maximum resoluƟon of the simulaƟon is set to one hour instead of 15 minutes in the base case.
Therefore, the resoluƟon of the energy markets, the balancing acƟvaƟon, imbalance prices and imbal-
ance seƩlements are all set to one hour. Compared to the base case with a resoluƟon of a quarter of
hour, many thermal constraints can be dropped. In parƟcular, ramping constraints are never binding.
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The decrease of the Ɵme resoluƟon leads to opƟmizaƟon problems with four Ɵmes fewer variables. The
computaƟon Ɵme for the whole month drops to two hours.
The total average producƟon cost decreases by 2.2% to 13.73 e/MWh. The day-ahead energy market
is not aﬀected by the change of resoluƟon. The intraday market keeps similar prices but exchanged
volumes decrease by 50% to 1.8% of the average producƟon. The forecast errors generated by the
mechanism described in 3.1 are doubled when used at an hourly resoluƟon. This error doubles the
amplitude of the imbalance signal but sƟll leads to 40% lower imbalance prices. These prices are the
results of lower hydro-electric reservoir stock values by the same amounts. Since technical constraints
of thermal producƟon are less binding; ﬂexibility from the hydro-electric producƟon is less requested.
The stock values decrease up to the point where they match the variable cost of CCGTs to have the
opportunity to sell the energy brought by the exogenous stock supplies into the energy markets. CCGTs
provide 50% of the balancing at an hourly resoluƟon which further decreases the use of the ﬂexibility
from the reservoirs. Even the regular nuclear producƟon is able to provide 5% of the upward balancing
capacity and 2% of the downward one. Results conﬁrm that ramping constraints are useless with one-
hour Ɵme resoluƟon but that the outcome of balancing acƟons is inﬂuenced at higher resoluƟons.
8.2. Benevolent monopoly
In this scenario all assets of the system, including the consumpƟon, are gathered into the porƞolio of a
single actor. Since the actor strategy is to balance itself at any cost, this scenario is similar to a benevolent
monopoly. Becausemarkets are not relevant inmonopoly situaƟons, no day-ahead nor intradaymarkets
are simulated and therefore the corresponding prices do not exist. Balancing is sƟll performed by the
system operator via the explicit communicaƟon of the capacity. The forecast mechanism is idenƟcal to
the base case. Since it is applied to the total consumpƟon and non-dispatchable producƟon, the forecast
of the residual demand of the monopoly is diﬀerent from the sum of the forecasts of the four actors.
The average producƟon cost obtained aŌer simulaƟon is 14.23 e/MWh, i.e. similar to the base case
taking into account the simulaƟon bias. This shows that the markets are funcƟoning well in this simula-
Ɵon case given the behavior of the market parƟcipants. Since there is only one actor managing the total
hydro-electric reservoirs, there is a single stock value. This results in only 3.5% of counter-acƟvaƟons
which comes from switches between blocks of OCGTs with reservoirs’ producƟon.
The energy mix in both cases is similar given the simulaƟon bias. Seƫng a 5% opƟmality gap on the
total of the system may lead to a less opƟmal soluƟon than four actors opƟmizing their porƞolio unƟl
they reach their individual 5% gap guarantee. This simulaƟon also took signiﬁcantly less computaƟon
Ɵme, 2 hours and 45minutes, partly explained by the lack of need to build ﬂexibility oﬀers to the energy
markets. This result encourages the use of global unit-commitmentmodels to perform studies on energy
mixes and global producƟon costs. However, mulƟ-actor models provide outcomes of market clearings,
exchanges between actors and diﬀerent actors strategies to manage their own porƞolio.
8.3. Perfect forecasts
In this case, the four actors make perfect forecasts and no outage occurs. Even if the actors have incen-
Ɵves to balance themselves, imbalances sƟll occur since the ﬁnal producƟon is the results of exchanges
between the power companies.
SimulaƟon results show that volumes exchanged in day-ahead are similar in the base case and the per-
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fect forecast case and themedian price are idenƟcal. Intraday volumes exchanged decrease by 20%. The
median intraday price and the standard deviaƟon are lower, respecƟvely at 27.88 e/MWh and 16.34
e/MWh. The standard deviaƟon of imbalances drops from 58.64 MW to 2.28 MW. The laƩer is mainly
supported by actor 3 with a standard deviaƟon of 1.88 MW. Since actor 3 owns no producƟon asset,
it can only rely on the markets to buy or sell its energy. This is nontrivial to achieve with block oﬀers,
binary acceptances, block links and the energy markets resoluƟon; 1 MWh in this model. The laƩer is
clearly themain cause of the remaining imbalances. Other actors can rely on their producƟon to balance
themselves. Actor 4 obtains no upward imbalance since it can always curtail its renewable producƟon.
The imbalance price drops by 10 e/MWh to a median of 32.2 e/MWh. The total producƟon costs de-
crease by 4% to 13.47e/MWh. The reducƟon of 0.56e/MWh comes from the idleness of OCGTs and a
1.25% increase of nuclear producƟon.
The results obtained with forecast errors and with a perfect forecast highlight that signiﬁcant volumes
of intraday exchanges are used by actors to balance their forecast errors. Thus, forecast errors should be
taken into account to properly analyze short-term electricity markets, especially intraday and balancing
markets.
8.4. Absence of intraday market
Removing the intraday prevents the reﬁnement of the producƟon schedules built aŌer the clearing of
the day-ahead market. In parƟcular, actors 1 and 2 have to handle variaƟons at the 15 minutes resolu-
Ɵon alone with respect to their hourly net posiƟon and the gap between the cleared soluƟon and their
technical constraints.
The simulaƟon results show an increase of the average producƟon cost by 6.77% to 14.98 e/MWh.
This cost increase results from a 1.5% decrease of the nuclear energy mainly compensated by a 0.86%
increase of hydro-electric reservoirs and 0.27% of OCGTs. The median day-ahead energy market price
is nearly idenƟcal but the standard deviaƟon doubles. The cause is the increased stock values where
the median increases by 44% to 77 e/MWh. This parƟcularly aﬀects day-ahead market prices at the
end of the simulated month when consumpƟon reaches the capacity of the producƟon and reservoirs
producƟon is in themoney. This results in an increase of median imbalance prices by 61% to 67e/MWh
for upward and downward direcƟons. The imbalance itself increases with a standard deviaƟon of 72.83
MW instead of 58.64 in the base case, which only corresponds to a 22% increase. Note that the system
operator is reacƟve in this simulaƟon. Increasing the operaƟonal window of the system operator could
reduce the average producƟon cost.
Removing intraday markets while considering technical constraints in actors’ oﬀers signiﬁcantly inﬂu-
ences the use of the various technologies: ﬂexible technologies are used more, to the detriment of less
ﬂexible technologies.
8.5. Price-based actor balancing
In this scenario, actor 1 uses the current imbalance prices as forecasts of the prices for the next one
hour and half if the imbalance of the system is important following the strategy described in SecƟon 3.2.
Note that in pracƟce this opportunity could be exploited by all actors, potenƟally with more aggressive
strategies, and lead to diﬀerent results.
The energy markets are leŌ unchanged between this proacƟve actor balancing case and the base one.
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There is no prominent diﬀerence in imbalance signals. However, the imbalance prices decrease by 22%
to reach a median of 32.6e/MWh. This decrease is caused by a 16.8% decrease of hydro-electric reser-
voirs stock values to a median of 35.95e/MWhwhile there is only a 5.5% decrease of the hydro-electric
reservoirs producƟon. The global balance of the system operator is stable since the costs from balancing
acƟvaƟons are covered by the imbalance seƩlement. Figure 13 provides an overview of the balancing
decisions taken by actor 1 in two days where the consumpƟon is close to the maximum producƟon ca-
pacity. In parƟcular, actor 1 helps the system if its scheduled deviaƟon is in the opposite direcƟon than
the system imbalance. For instance, it happens the second day at 11:00. However, the ﬁrst day at 8:00
or 18:00, actor 1 schedules a deviaƟon in the same direcƟon as the imbalance signal. In both cases the
system is short at the Ɵme of the scheduled deviaƟon and one hour and a half before when the actor
makes its forecast. Therefore, this deviaƟon was intended to spare producƟon costs assuming that the
imbalance price will stay constant. The imbalance price increased in both cases which qualiﬁes it as a
bad anƟcipaƟon. The total revenues of actor 1 are not signiﬁcantly impacted by these acƟons. Observed
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Figure 13: Eﬀect of the balancing strategy of actor 1 on the imbalance signal and the imbalance price in
two days where the consumpƟon is close to the maximum producƟon capacity.
In pracƟce, it is diﬃcult to forecast how the system imbalance will evolve within the next few hours. The
results with a risk-taking balancing strategy conﬁrms this intuiƟon.
8.6. ProacƟve system operator
This scenario sets the neutralizaƟon delay to one hour, prevenƟng power companies balancing them-
selves aŌer this delay, whereas the system operator is allowed to act proacƟvely up to one hour ahead.
In comparison, the base case corresponds to a reacƟve system operator. The results of this secƟon
are parƟcularly meant to show the capabiliƟes of the model and not to draw conclusions on the cost
diﬀerence between a proacƟve and reacƟve system operator. Such results could not be obtained by
comparing single-run simulaƟon due to the simulaƟon bias.
Figure 14 shows the balancing acƟvaƟons per technology in two days where the consumpƟon is close
to the maximum producƟon capacity. The simulaƟon of the reacƟve base case is presented in Figure
14a. The only available technologies are the remote-control reservoirs, the ﬂexible nuclear unit and the
OCGTs. Economic counter acƟvaƟons occur around 12:00 and at 18:00 the ﬁrst day. Power companies
prepare their schedule based on their forecast of the residual demand. If this residual demand is high,
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OCGTs may be scheduled to produce. If the realizaƟon is lower than the forecast, the system operator



































(b) ProacƟve system operator case.
Flexible nuclear Reservoirs OCGT CCGT
Figure 14: Balancing acƟvaƟons per technology in a simulaƟon of the reacƟve base case and one with a
proacƟve system operator over two days.
The balancing acƟvaƟon resulƟng from the simulaƟon of a system with a proacƟve system operator is
given in Figure 14b. Note that the acƟvated volumes are not idenƟcal since the neutralizaƟon delay is
diﬀerent and the simulaƟon bias changes the imbalance of the system. Compared to the reacƟve case,
CCGTs can now be used for balancing if the system operator is able to anƟcipate imbalances. Correct
anƟcipaƟon occurs in the beginning of the ﬁrst day and around 6:00 the second day. There are some
cases of proacƟve acƟvaƟon leading to counter-acƟvaƟons due to the bad previsions. These cases arise
the second day at 16:00 and 23:00 wheremost of the balancing energy from proacƟve acƟvaƟon is com-
pensated by ﬂexible nuclear producƟon. The performance of a proacƟve system operator is therefore
highly dependent on its ability to forecast system imbalances.
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